Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitation by Wistrich, Andrew J.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 50 | Issue 2 Article 5
Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of
Limitation
Andrew J. Wistrich
Copyright c 2008 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Andrew J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitation, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 607
(2008), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol50/iss2/5
PROCRASTINATION, DEADLINES, AND STATUTES OF
LIMITATION
ANDREW J. WISTRICH*
ABSTRACT
Statutes of limitation are deadlines. Although psychologists have
discovered a great deal about how people respond to deadlines
during the past thirty years, the basic structure of statutes of
limitation has not changed since at least 1623. This Article explores
the question of whether the received model of statutes of limitation
remains optimal in light of what we now know about procrastina-
tion, the planning fallacy, loss aversion, intertemporal discounting,
the student syndrome, and other features of human cognition. It
concludes by suggesting a more modern approach to statutes of
limitation that is based on a better understanding of how people
actually behave. Specifically, the archaic "all-or-nothing" approach
should be abandoned in favor of a more modern, incremental
approach that gradually decreases the value of untimely claims as
the duration of the plaintiff's delay in filing increases.
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INTRODUCTION
Time limits are a fundamental aspect of life.' Not surprisingly,
law contains many of them.2 Statutes of limitation are perhaps the
most prominent example. A statute of limitation sets a deadline by
which a claimant must file a lawsuit. If the deadline is missed, the
right to a decision on the merits and eligibility for a remedy are
1. See NIcoLo MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN BOOKS OF TITUS LIVIuS,
reprinted in THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSES 99, 397 (Christian E. Detmold trans., Random
House 1940) ('CThere is nothing more true than that all the things of this world have a limit
to their existence .... ); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD II, act. III, sc. 2, line 103
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1939) (1597) ("The worst is death, and death will have his day.");
DAVID STEINDL-RAST, THE MUSIC OF SILENCE 5 (1995) ("Western culture reinforces th[e] ...
conception of time as a limited commodity: we are always meeting deadlines; we are always
short on time, we are always running out of time.").
2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries .... "); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during
the Term of four Years ...."); 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2000) (specifying the maximum term of
imprisonment for felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000)
(limiting the number of hours that may be worked each week without payment of extra
compensation for "overtime'); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring that a notice of appeal be
filed within thirty days of entry of the judgment or order appealed from); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)
(requiring federal district courts to issue scheduling orders establishing deadlines for the
completion of various pretrial activities); Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 247, 249-61 (2007) (discussing statutes that expire or "sunset" after a specified period
of time has elapsed); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative
Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 925 (2008) (discussing congressional and judicial requirements
that administrative agencies commence or complete actions within a prescribed period of
time); Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials,
35 ARiz. L. REV. 663, 668-95 (1993) (discussing judicial imposition of limits on the duration
of trials); Neil M.B. Rowe, The Year-and-a-Day Rule: A Common Law Vestige That Has
Outlived Its Purposes, 8 JONES L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) (discussing the rule prohibiting "homocide
prosecutions when the victim survives for more than one year and a day following the blow
that eventually caused the victim's death"); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A
Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761, 801-05
(1977) (discussing statutes requiring that judicial decisions be made within a fixed period of
time); Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2421-
23 (2001) (discussing statues vesting title to real property in an adverse and exclusive
possessor, thereby extinguishing the interest of the record owner, after a prescribed period
of time).
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forfeited.' As one scholar has observed, "[s]tatutes of limitation
elevate the temporal element to a categorical role."4
Statutes of limitation are ubiquitous. Almost every civil claim and
criminal prosecution must be filed within a prescribed period of
time. This is true not only in the United States, but also throughout
the world.5 The crime of murder is the only common exception.6
Statutes of limitation also have been around for a long time. Some
sorts of time limits have been imposed on civil lawsuits and criminal
prosecutions for millennia.7 The direct ancestors of American
statutes of limitation can be traced back for centuries. The first
English statute of limitation for real property actions was enacted
over five hundred years ago.8 Subsequent versions grouped real
property actions into categories to which time limits of various
lengths were assigned depending upon the character of the right
sued upon.9 A later, more refined, and more comprehensive version
of this approach, commonly known as the Limitations Act of 1623,
included personal as well as real property actions.1 ° That statute
3. See 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OFACTIONS § 1.1 (1991) ("Statutes of limitations
often foreclose judicial actions by virtue of expiration of the allotted time."); 1 HORACE G.
WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY § 1 (4th ed. 1916)
("Statutes of limitation are such legislative enactments as prescribe the periods within which
actions may be brought upon certain claims, or within which certain rights may be enforced
.... "). See generally Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177
(1950).
4. Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1183 (1986).
5. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("Statutes of limitation ... are found
and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence."); Edgar H. Ailes, Limitation of
Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 MICH. L. REV. 474,474 (1933) ("All civilized States, in the
interest of an efficient administration of justice, have felt compelled to fix time limits beyond
which access to their courts would be denied to aggrieved parties.").
6. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 799 (West 2008).
7. See WILLIAM D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING STATUTES 7 (1978)
("Statutes of limitation relating to real property may be traced to ancient Greece or beyond
...."); RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN
PRIVATE LAW 283 (James Crawford Ledlie trans., Clarendon Press 3d ed. 1907) ("Emperors
Honorious and Theodosius, ... moved by obvious considerations of convenience, enacted in 424
A.D. that all actions should be barred within a certain period.").
8. See 1488-89, 4 Hen. 7, c. 24 (Eng.).
9. See The Act of Limitation with a Proviso, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.).
10. See 1623, 21 Jac., c. 16 (Eng.).
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provided the model upon which most American statutes of limita-
tion are based.1'
Nearly all statutes of limitation possess the same essential
structure: they classify claims into groups, they assign each group
of claims a limitation period of fixed duration, and they extinguish
claims not filed before the limitation period expires. The key feature
of that structure is a long plateau that suddenly ends in a cliff. The
value of the plaintiffs claim remains the same throughout the
prescribed limitation period. When the limitation period expires,
however, the value of the plaintiffs claim suddenly drops to zero.
This "all-or-nothing" approach is utilized in virtually every statute
of limitation.12
The present structure of statutes of limitation possesses at least
three serious flaws. First, it allows plaintiffs to wait until deep in
the limitation period before filing. In fact, a plaintiff who waits until
the very last day of the limitation period suffers no penalty whatso-
ever, even if the limitation period is several years long. For example,
if the limitation period is four years in duration, 3 then a statute of
limitation structured in the typical manner treats delays in filing
suit of one, two, three, or even four years minus one day exactly the
same. The assumption implicit in such a structure-that nothing of
importance changes with the passage of time until the end of the
limitation period is reached-is counterintuitive and contrary to
11. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("[The English statute of limitations
of the 21st of James I ... was adopted in most of the American colonies before the Revolution,
and has since been the foundation of nearly all of the like legislation in this country.").
12. Some early English statutes of limitation concerning real property claims had a
somewhat different structure. They prohibited lawsuits based on claims arising before a fixed
date, usually twenty or thirty years earlier. Often the cutoff date was linked to an important
historical event heralding the beginning of a new era with which everyone would be familiar,
such as the transfer of power from one monarch to another. See Thomas E. Atkinson, Some
Procedural Aspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 158 (1927) ("By the
Statute of Merton [1235, 20 Hen. 3, c. 8 (Eng.)], the limitation was changed to the date of the
Coronation of Henry II and by the Statute of Westminster I [1275, 3 Edw., c. 39 (Eng.)], it was
set at the Coronation of Richard I in 1189, where it remained until 1540."). See generally
HENRY THOMAS BANNING, A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE STATUTE LAW OF LIMITATION OF
ACTIONS 2 (2d ed. 1892); 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 181 (1895).
13. Some periods are shorter and some are longer, but this is a common duration. See, e.g.,
CAL. ClV. PROC. CODE § 337(1) (West 2008) (prescribing a four-year limitation period for
breach of written contract); id. § 343 (prescribing a four-year limitation period for all claims
not specifically provided for).
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experience.14 Among other things, most evidence deteriorates over
time,"m societal attitudes toward particular laws evolve,16 and the
passage of time erodes both the benefit to the plaintiff of prevailing
on the claim and the corresponding deterrent effect on the defen-
dant and others, assuming that prejudgment interest is not
available.17 These changes are gradual, not avulsive. They occur
throughout the limitation period, rather than only at the end.'8 With
each passing day the purposes of the limitation system are eroded,
but the resulting interim harms to defendants, to the justice
system, to society, and even to plaintiffs themselves, are not
reflected in the penalty imposed upon plaintiffs. Consequently, the
limitation system gives plaintiffs little incentive to avoid them.
A second problem with the present structure of statutes of
limitation is that the penalty exacted is drastic. If the plaintiff
misses just one deadline, the plaintiffs claim is extinguished. Late
filing by as little as one day results in the loss of the entire value of
the plaintiffs claim. There is no effort to match the severity of the
penalty to the degree of the plaintiffs fault or to the gravity of the
injury caused by the plaintiffs delay. This not only hurts plaintiffs
with meritorious claims, it also undermines the policy of the
substantive law on which their claims are based.
A defect in the present structure of statutes of limitation is
related to its harshness. Because the penalty for missing the dead-
line is so drastic, courts feel pressure to create ad hoc exceptions or
to distort legal doctrine in order to avoid harsh or unjust results. 19
14. See, e.g., OVID, METAMORPHOSES 372 (Rolfe Humphries trans., Indiana Univ. Press
1955) ("Time devours all things."); SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS AT COLONUS (Dover 1999) ("[To the
Gods alone belongs it never to be old or die, but all things else melt with all-powerful Time.").
15. Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation,
28 PAC. L.J. 453, 474-77 (1997) [hereinafter Ochoa & Wistrich, Puzzling Purposes].
16. Id. at 493-95.
17. Id. at 492-93.
18. Id. at 511 (noting that "the digital, on or off quality of limitation of actions contrasts
sharply with the analog, gradual nature of the evils it seeks to prevent").
19. See Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1990) ("All fixed deadlines
seem harsh because all can be missed by a whisker."); Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars: A
New Rationale for the Existence of Statutes of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
99, 100 (2002) (explaining that statutes of limitation came to be viewed as justice-defeating
technicalities during the 1970s and 1980s, and observing that the negative attitude was soon
reflected in a series of statutes and court decisions weakening them); Gideon Parchomovsky,
Peter Seligman & Steve Thel, Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 745
[Vol. 50:607612
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This sort of nullification is seldom desirable, but it is especially
troublesome in this context. Statutes of limitation already are
problematic for lawyers. The challenges they present for non-
lawyers are obviously even greater.2 ° There is an enormous number
of statutes of limitation2' and there are many areas of uncertainty
in their application,22 such as the classification of claims (which
renders the choice of the appropriate limitation period uncertain), 3
the implementation of the discovery rule of accrual (which makes it
uncertain when the limitation period commences to run),24 the
judicial creation of doctrines such as equitable tolling (which make
it uncertain whether the limitation period continues to run, or
instead is paused, and if so, for how long it is paused),25 and so on.
(2007) ('The need to make all-or-nothing decisions leads courts to tie themselves in doctrinal
knots or to deviate from established legal principles, causing confusion and uncertainty.").
20. It is important to recognize that lawyers are of limited help to plaintiffs in the statute
of limitation context. Many plaintiffs never hire a lawyer and simply proceed pro se.
Obviously, those who never hire a lawyer must try to parse the statute and related case law
on their own. But even those who are able to retain counsel must decide how soon to do so,
and the statute of limitation is one of the factors that should inform their decision. In
considering when to hire a lawyer, plaintiffs often implicitly assess the duration of the
limitation period without the benefit of a lawyer's advice. Whether they retain counsel or not,
many plaintiffs must therefore initially determine for themselves how long they can wait
before filing suit. An attorney can only help after he or she is consulted.
21. See Jerald M. Montoya, Introduction to California Statutes of Limitation, 25 Sw. U.
L. REV. 745, at i (1996) (estimating that California has approximately 32,000 statutes
imposing time limits on procedural or substantive rights).
22. See Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1015, 1072 (1997) ('CThe purported certainty, simplicity and objectivity of existing
limitations law is an illusion and a hoax.... Limitations law... delivers ... uncertain application
of a lengthy and complex series of ambiguous and subjective rules, with a resulting
unpredictable outcome.").
23. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, Unraveling the Tangled Web: Choosing the
Proper Statute of Limitation for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, 26 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1996) (describing the uncertain process by which claims are
classified and the appropriate limitation period divined).
24. See Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., 151 P.3d 1151, 1164 (2007) (stating that "the
essence of the discovery rule [is] that a plaintiff need not file a cause of action before he or she
has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements" (quotations omitted)); Stephen
V. O'Neal, Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California's Discovery Exceptions
Swallows the Rule, 68 CAL. L. REV. 106, 123 (1980).
25. See Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716,738-39 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989) ("The 'equitable tolling' doctrine is a judicially created doctrine designed to
prevent unjust and technical forfeitures of the right to a trial on the merits where the purpose
of the statute of limitations-timely notice to the defendant of the plaintiff's claims-has been
satisfied.'); Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, Limitation of Legal Malpractice Actions:
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Not surprisingly, statutes of limitation are frequently litigated.26
Indeed, missing the statute of limitation is the largest single source
of legal malpractice claims.27 When courts are induced to twist facts
or distort limitation of actions law in order to avoid harsh results in
particular cases, this uncertainty is compounded. The consequences
are, among other things, increased expenditure of judicial time in
resolving statute of limitation issues, more errors in the judicial
application of limitation of action rules, more lawyer and pro se
litigant time invested in researching statute of limitation issues,
more legal malpractice claims, more inadvertent forfeitures of
claims, and greater disparities in the treatment of similarly situated
litigants.
During the past century, many aspects of the legal system have
been transformed.28 The same, of course, could be said of virtually
every field of human activity.29 We now use telephones and email to
communicate, automobiles and airplanes to travel, pharmaceuticals
to treat disease, and so on. None of these inventions pre-dated 1850,
much less 1623. By contrast, it is remarkable how little statutes of
limitation have changed since the Limitations Act of 1623. Their
essential structure has endured. To be sure, there have been
refinements. Courts and legislatures have created intricate rules of
accrual and tolling, and developed increasingly sophisticated ways
DefiningActual Injury and the Problem of Simultaneous Litigation, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 51-54
(1994) (summarizing the equitable tolling doctrine).
26. WILLIAM F. RYLAARSDAM & PAUL TURNER, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL-STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, preface (The Rutter Group 2007)
("Indeed, statutes of limitations may well be the single most litigated issue in civil cases;
almost 15% of published opinions in civil appeals, one way or another, deal with issues posed
by statues of limitations.").
27. See 3 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 23.3 (2007 ed.)
('The most frequently alleged error in a legal malpractice action is the attorney's failure to
comply with a time limitation.... Often the error is the failure to sue before the statute of
limitations bars the claim."); RYLAARSDAM & TURNER, supra note 26, at preface ("Statutes of
limitations provide a unique challenge to civil litigators. A missed statute is the most common
error made by plaintiffs' lawyers.").
28. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 584 (1973) ("In the
law itself, there was rapid, ceaseless change in the 20th century.").
29. See ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 23 (1970) ('Until this century ...' social change
was 'so slow, that it would pass unnoticed in one person's lifetime. That is no longer so. The
rate of change has increased so much that our imagination can't keep up.") (quoting C.P.
Snow); ARNOLD TOYNBEE, EXPERIENCES 181 (1969) ("The pace has been accelerating
constantly since the earliest date from which any record of human affairs has survived.").
[Vol. 50:607614
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of handling a myriad of issues, such as continuing wrongs. Whether
these refinements and added complexities strengthen or weaken the
ability of the limitation system to achieve its goals is debatable.
What is striking, however, is that despite the scholarly attention
lavished on statutes of limitation, ° the soundness of their essential
structure almost never has been questioned.3' Why, during this time
of extraordinarily rapid change, has this rather crude and arbi-
trary structure remained intact? In particular, why has the "all-or-
nothing" approach-that is, the assumption that the value of the
plaintiffs claim should remain flat throughout the limitation
period, and then suddenly drop from 100 percent to zero overnight-
persisted? When one considers the importance of statutes of
limitation, and the persistence of their problematic structure during
a period of rapid advance-not only in law, but also in nearly every
other field of endeavor-a further question presents itself: Is this
the best we can do, or have we learned things since 1623 that can
help us to improve the way in which statutes of limitation are
structured? My answer is that we can do better.32
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I briefly outlines the
policies furthered and hindered by statutes of limitation, providing
the background against which the advantages and disadvantages of
30. See, e.g., Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37
CREIGHTON L. REV. 493 (2004); Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 GONZ.
L. REV. 271 (2008); Bruce A. McGovern, The New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods
for Seeking Tax Refunds: Its History, Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for Reform, 65
Mo. L. REV. 797 (2000); Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitation, 45 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 115 (2008); Richardson, supra note 22; Jonathan W. Diehl, Note, Drafting a Fair
DNA Exception to the Statute of Limitations in Sexual Assault Cases, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 431
(1999).
31. One article that does question the essential structure of statutes of limitation is Ehud
Guttel & Michael T. Novick, A New Approach to Old Cases: Reconsidering Statutes of
Limitation, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 129 (2004). For a discussion of the suggested reform described
in that article, see infra Part III.C.
32. In undertaking this inquiry, I am not questioning whether we should have statutes
of limitation at all; that question already has been answered in favor of statutes of limitation.
See Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (noting that statutes of limitation
"have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system"); Wood v.
Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of
society."); Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (stating that allowing claims to
be "brought at any distance of time .... would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws.").
See generally Ochoa & Wistrich, Puzzling Purposes, supra note 15. Instead, I am questioning
only their basic structure.
2008]
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their existing structure and possible alternative structures must
be measured. Part II summarizes psychological research concern-
ing procrastination, the planning fallacy, and the ways in which
humans react to threatened losses and to deadlines. This empirical
data makes it possible to transcend the intuitions about human
behavior on which ancient statues of limitation were based and to
think creatively about potential reforms. Part III discusses three
alternative structures for statutes of limitation that are graduated,
rather than all-or-nothing, in character. Part IV analyzes the
strengths and weakness of what I consider to be the most attractive
alternative structure. Part V briefly sketches how the incremental
depreciation of claim value might be applied in two different
contexts. Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting that an
incremental depreciation of the value of the plaintiffs claim as time
passes and societal costs from delayed filing accrue most effectively
utilizes the insights of psychological research in seeking to promote
the purposes of statutes of limitation while at the same time
minimizing their costs.
I. THE PURPOSES OF CIL STATUTES OF LIMITATION
Several years ago, I coauthored an article analyzing the policies
supporting and opposing statutes of limitation in civil cases. 33
Readers interested in a detailed discussion of those policies may
wish to examine that article. It makes sense, however, to briefly
summarize the relevant conclusions here. When examining the
structure of statutes of limitation and considering the desirability
of alternative structures, it is important to keep in mind the reasons
why we have statutes of limitation and the balance they attempt to
strike.
In our previous article, Professor Tyler Ochoa and I identified the
following as the policies favoring the limitation of civil actions: (1)
promote repose, of which we identified four distinct aspects, namely:
(a) allow peace of mind, (b) avoid disrupting settled expectations, (c)
reduce uncertainty for the defendant and others, and (d) reduce
33. See Ochoa & Wistrich, Puzzling Purposes, supra note 15. For an interesting discussion
of the purposes of civil statutes of limitation see Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of
Limitation-Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 132-34 (1955).
616 [Vol. 50:607
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protective measures and associated costs; (2) minimize the deterio-
ration of evidence, of which we identified four distinct aspects,
namely: (a) ensure accurate fact-finding, (b) prevent fraud, (c)
reduce litigation costs, and (d) preserve the integrity of the legal
system; (3) place defendants and plaintiffs on an equal footing; (4)
promote the cultural value of diligence; (5) encourage the prompt
enforcement of substantive law; (6) avoid the retrospective applica-
tion of contemporary standards; and (7) reduce the volume of
litigation, of which we identified three distinct aspects, namely: (a)
reduce the overall number of claims filed, (b) reduce the number of
unmeritorious claims filed, and (c) reduce the number of disfavored
claims filed.34 We concluded that although most of these policies are
worth promoting, some provide negligible support for limiting civil
actions because they are either unimportant or better promoted by
other means. Those that we concluded fell into this category were:
(1) minimize deterioration of evidence, but only insofar as it seeks
to prevent fraud and to preserve the integrity of the legal system; (2)
place defendants and plaintiffs on an equal footing; (3) promote the
cultural value of diligence; and (4) reduce the volume of litigation,
in all three of its aspects. 35 That left us with the following as policies
providing strong support for limiting civil actions: (1) promote
repose (to allow peace of mind, avoid disrupting settled expecta-
tions, reduce uncertainty for the defendant and others, and reduce
evidence preservation and insurance-related costs); (2) minimize
deterioration of evidence (to ensure accurate fact-finding and to
reduce litigation costs); (3) encourage the prompt enforcement of
substantive law; and (4) avoid the retrospective application of
contemporary standards.
We also analyzed the policies opposing limitation of civil actions.
We identified two: (1) promote adjudication of claims on their sub-
stantive merits; and (2) vindicate meritorious claims. 36 We con-
cluded that both of those policies weigh strongly against limiting
civil actions. We noted, however, that although limiting civil
actions impairs the policies opposing the limitation of civil actions,
34. See Ochoa & Wistrich, Puzzling Purposes, supra note 15, at 460-501.
35. See id. at 480, 483-92, 495-99.
36. See id. at 500- 10.
37. See id. at 501-03, 509.
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it nonetheless indirectly enhances them to some extent by helping
to ensure the accuracy of adjudication (without which the adjudica-
tion of claims on their substantive merits arguably possesses little
societal value) and by encouraging the prompt litigation of meritori-
ous claims (so as to maximize both the compensatory value and the
deterrent value of the litigation of claims).3"
A sound limitation system, then, effectively encourages the
prompt filing of claims, but it does so in a manner that simulta-
neously minimizes the inadvertent forfeiture of claims. Although a
grasp of the policies favoring and disfavoring statutes of limitation
is essential to assessing the desirability of potential reforms, it is
not sufficient. It also is necessary to take into account how plaintiffs
are likely to react to the proposed changes in making choices about
when to hire a lawyer or file a lawsuit. Recent research in psychol-
ogy can illuminate us on that score, and it is to that I now turn.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PLANNING, PROCRASTINATION, AND
DEADLINES
A. Loss Aversion
People evaluate changes not in the abstract, but relative to a
reference point, such as the status quo.39 Not all changes, however,
are valued equally. Losses or changes that make things worse affect
people more deeply than gains or changes that make things better.4 °
An example illustrates this phenomenon well.
38. See id. at 492, 503-04.
39. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRIcA 263, 279 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect
Theory] (describing the role of loss aversion in prospect theory).
40. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 159, 160 (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (defining loss aversion as the phenomenon that "the
disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it"); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 143, 150 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice] ("The basic intuition
concerning loss aversion is that losses (outcomes below the reference state) loom larger than
corresponding gains (outcomes above the reference state).").
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A simple application of loss aversion ... is penalty aversion.
People will act to avoid penalties but not necessarily to obtain
bonuses in rhetorically different presentations of the same
underlying facts. As Richard Thaler noted in a real-world
observation, when a gas station charged a "penalty" for using
credit cards ($2.00 versus $1.90, say), people paid cash; when a
gas station across the street gave a "bonus" for using cash ($1.90
versus $2.00), people used credit cards.41
The magnitude of this effect is substantial. Experiments have
shown that people must be paid a large amount to delay receipt of
a reward, but are unwilling to pay large amounts to delay imposi-
tion of a fine.42 In one study, subjects were indifferent between
receiving ten dollars immediately and receiving twenty-one dollars
after a delay of one year, but also were indifferent between losing
ten dollars immediately and losing fifteen dollars after a delay of
one year.4" This study suggests two things. The first is that not only
are present losses felt more keenly than future gains, but future
losses are discounted at a lower rate than future gains. The second
is that future gains are discounted at more than twice the rate of
future losses. People, then, are roughly twice as anxious to avoid a
one hundred dollar loss as they are eager to obtain a one hundred
dollar gain.44 Others have reported finding even greater disparities.
41. Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Rethinking Redistribution: Tax Policy in an
Era of Rising Inequality: The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745,
1751 (2005) (citing Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39,45 (1980)); see also George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies
in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, in CHOICE OVER TIME 119, 122
(George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992).
42. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF
ECONOMIC LIFE 96 (1992) [hereinafter THALER, WINNER'S CURSE].
43. Loewenstein & Prelec, supra note 41, at 122 (citing George Loewenstein, The
Weighting of Waiting: Response Mode Effects in Intertemporal Choice (1987) (unpublished
working paper, on file with Center for Decision Research, University of Chicago)).
44. Tversky & Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice, supra note 40, at 150-58; see
also THALER, WINNER'S CURSE, supra note 42, at 70; Chip Heath, Richard P. Larrick & George
Wu, Goals as Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 79, 87 (1999) (stating that "[s]tudies of
risky choice and riskless choice have presented converging evidence that losses are weighted
approximately two times more than equivalent gains (the most common values for this
'coefficient of loss aversion' fall between 2 and 4)") (citations omitted); Kahneman & Tversky,
Prospect Theory, supra note 39, at 279 ("The aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum
of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount.');
Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehier, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88
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According to a different study, for example, discount rates for future
gains were from three to ten times greater than the discount rate for
future losses.45
Theoretically, the justice system could attempt to encourage
prompt filing of civil lawsuits by rewarding plaintiffs rather than
penalizing them. The phenomenon of loss aversion, however,
indicates that the reward would have to be at least twice as large as
the penalty in order for the incentive to be equally effective. Thus,
we would have to reward plaintiffs for filing on time by doubling or
tripling the value of their claims merely to achieve the same effect
that we presently achieve by extinguishing the value of their claims.
That might distort the incentives created by the substantive law by,
for example, overdeterring defendants from engaging in conduct
that occasionally is harmful but is socially beneficial overall. Of
course, when a statute of limitation reduces or eliminates the value
of a claim, that also distorts the incentives created by the substan-
tive law, but this time by underdeterring defendants. Because the
latter causes a smaller distortion than the former, however, it
represents the better choice. The justice system therefore selected
the right path when it decided to penalize plaintiffs for untimely
filing rather than rewarding them for timely filing.46
Loss aversion also may explain why the unavailability of pre-
judgment interest for many claims,47 or a below-market rate of
prejudgment interest, does not provide a sufficient incentive for
some plaintiffs to file their claims promptly. Plaintiffs probably view
prejudgment interest as a deferred gain (i.e., if they win they will
recover the $100 value of their claim plus an additional $10 in
prejudgment interest) rather than viewing the lack of prejudgment
interest as causing a loss (i.e., the gradual erosion of the value of
their claim from $100 to $90). Therefore, depriving plaintiffs of
prejudgment interest, which already occurs for some sorts of claims,
would not be a suitable substitute for statutes of limitation.
CORNELL L. REv. 583, 601 (2003) ("[The pain that Sarah feels upon losing $100 is likely to be
about twice as intense as the joy that Emily feels upon gaining $100.").
45. Thaler, supra note 41, at 41-42.
46. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 206, 216 (2006) (suggesting that to encourage breast feeding, society should
emphasize the losses suffered from not breast feeding rather than the gains obtained from
breast feeding).
47. See CAL. CIrV. CODE §§ 3287-91 (West 2008).
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B. Planning Fallacy
People frequently underestimate how long it will take to com-
plete future tasks.4" For example, the Sydney Opera House required
sixteen years to complete, instead of the six years originally
planned, and the completed building was considerably scaled down
from the original design, yet far more expensive than anticipated.49
Similarly, only 1 percent of major military high technology pur-
chases are delivered on time and on budget.5 ° The phenomenon is
not limited to large or long-term projects, however. We all have
experience with the home remodeling project that required months
to complete rather than the weeks that the contractor had esti-
mated, or the academic paper that took a month to write rather
than the week that we had projected.
Psychologists call this phenomenon the planning fallacy. It has
been defined as "the tendency to be overly optimistic about how long
it will take to perform a task in the future, even though people are
aware that in the past they have not finished [their] tasks by the
predicted time."51 In general, "predicted completion times for specific
future tasks tend to be more optimistic than can be justified by the
actual completion times or by the predictors' general beliefs about
the amount of time such tasks usually take."52 The phenomenon is
so pervasive that one software development expert joked that the
planned completion date for a computer program typically is "the
48. See Michael M. Roy, Nicholas J.S. Christenfeld & Craig R.M. McKenzie,
Underestimating the Duration of Future Events: Memory Incorrectly Used or Memory Bias?,
131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 738, 738 (2005). See generally David A. Armor & Aaron M. Sackett,
Accuracy, Error, and Bias and Predictions for Real Versus Hypothetical Events, 91 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 583, 583 (2006) ("To date, several hundred studies have shown
that people's predictions tend to be excessively and unrealistically optimistic.") (citations
omitted).
49. PETER HALL, GREAT PLANNING DISASTERS 138 (1980).
50. Roger Buehler, Dale W. Griffin & Michael Ross, Inside the Planning Fallacy: The
Causes and Consequences of Optimistic Time Predictions, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 250, 268 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel
Kahneman eds., 2002) [hereinafter Buehler, Griffin & Ross, Inside the Planning Fallacy].
51. Roy, Christenfeld & McKenzie, supra note 48, at 742 (citing Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures, 12 TIMS STUD. MGMT.
SCI. 313 (1979)).
52. Buehler, Griffin & Ross, Inside the Planning Fallacy, supra note 50, at 250.
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most optimistic prediction that has a non-zero probability of coming
true.' ,53
In one early study, college undergraduates were asked to estimate
how long it would take them to complete various tasks.54 The results
were as follows:
In [Study 1], undergraduates estimated when they would finish
their honors thesis. On average, participants underestimated
their completion time by 39%. For Study 2, participants made
predictions for an everyday, nonacademic task (i.e., writing a
letter to a friend) and an academic task (i.e., completing an
essay) that would be finished within the next week. Participants,
on average, underestimated how long it would take by 46%.
Study 3 again had participants estimate how long it would take
to complete an academic task that they planned to finish in the
next 2 weeks using a think-out-loud procedure. After 2 weeks,
only 70% of participants had actually completed the task, and of
those that did, duration to finish was underestimated by 15% ....
For Study 4, participants were asked to estimate when, in
comparison with the deadline, they would complete a 1-hr
computer tutorial program. Overall, participants underesti-
mated when they would finish the task by 12%."5
As the results of this study suggest, the planning fallacy is a trap
into which most people are likely to fall in a wide variety of
situations.6
In another study, subjects were asked to predict when they
would file their tax returns.57 The subjects who expected a tax
53. TOM DEMARCO, CONTROLLING SOFTWARE PROJECTS: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENTAND
ESTIMATION 14 (1982).
54. See Roger Buehler, Dale W. Griffin & Michael Ross, Exploring the "PlanningFallacy":
Why People Underestimate Their Task Completion Times, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
366 (1994) [hereinafter Buehler, Griffin & Ross, Exploring the 'Planning Fallacy'].
55. Roy, Christenfeld & MacKenzie, supra note 48, at 739 (summarizing the result of the
studies conducted in Buehler, Griffin & Ross, Exploring the 'Planning Fallacy," supra note
54).
56. Id. at 741 ('CThe tendency to underestimate seems to be a very general phenomenon
found with quite different types of tasks. Almost all of the studies reviewed found a sizable
tendency to underestimate.").
57. See Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin & Heather MacDonald, The Role of Motivated
Reasoning in Optimistic Time Predictions, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 238, 240-
42 (1997) [hereinafter Buehler, Griffin & MacDonald, Motivated Reasoning].
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refund predicted that they would file their tax returns an average
of 27.6 days before the deadline, but they actually filed their tax
returns later, just 15.2 days before the deadline on average.58 Those
not expecting a refund also underestimated the time required to file
their tax returns, although their predictions were somewhat more
accurate. 9 They expected to file their tax returns an average of 16.9
days before the deadline, but actually filed them just 12.9 days
before the deadline on average.6" Thus, all of the subjects in the
experiment underestimated how long it would take them to file their
tax returns, with those who believed they would receive a refund
underestimating the time required most severely.6'
Like the subjects in the experiment who thought they would
receive a tax refund, plaintiffs filing lawsuits typically believe that
they will obtain a recovery. Otherwise, they would not bother to file
at all. The experiment suggests that like those expecting a tax
refund, plaintiffs are likely to underestimate the time required to
file a lawsuit. Such underestimation of task completion time may be
mildly costly in terms of foregone interest for someone who expects
a tax refund, but may be catastrophic for a plaintiff because missing
the deadline prescribed by the statute of limitation may extinguish
the claim entirely,62 not merely slightly erode its value. In addition,
underestimation appears to be greatest when monetary incentives
for prompt completion are available.63 Finally, for most people, filing
a lawsuit is a more complex, unfamiliar, and longer-term task than
filing a tax return. Thus, the duration of that task probably would
be underestimated even more severely than the amount of time
required to file a tax return.
Several explanations for the tendency to underestimate task
duration have been offered. These include the hypotheses that
58. Id. at 241.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See Ferguson, supra note 7, at 1 ("[A] limited period of time is provided for the
bringing of an action and, if the action is not commenced in time, the lapse of time will
constitute a defense to the suit or will deprive the plaintiff of his right.").
63. See Buehler, Griffin & McDonald, Motivated Reasoning, supra note 57, at 241;
Stephanie J. Byram, Cognitive and Motivational Factors Influencing Time Prediction, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 216, 235-36 (1997); Roy, Christenfeld & McKenzie, supra
note 48, at 740.
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people (a) fail to remember that in the past they have been
interrupted by surprises, (b) do not remember all the
subcomponents of the task when planning, (c) are overly narrow
in their focus on the task, and/or (d) disregard memories of how
long similar tasks have taken in the past.6 4
People may also be overly influenced by the strength of their current
intentions.65 They may believe that because they feel strongly about
doing something today they will feel equally strongly about doing it
tomorrow, excessively discounting the possibility that their feelings
or external conditions will change tomorrow and render their
present desires and intentions less attractive and therefore less
influential.66
64. Roy, Christenfeld & McKenzie, supra note 48, at 742 (citations omitted); see also
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures,
in JUDGMENT UNDERUNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 414,415 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) ("The planning fallacy is a consequence of the tendency to
neglect distributional data and to adopt what may be termed an internal approach to
prediction, in which one focuses on the constituents of the specific problem rather than on the
distribution of outcomes in similar cases. The internal approach to the evaluation of plans is
likely to produce underestimation. A building can only be completed on time, for example, if
there are no delays in the delivery of materials, no strikes, no unusual weather conditions,
and so on. Although each of these disturbances is unlikely, the probability that at least one
of them will occur may be substantial. This combinatorial consideration, however, is not
adequately represented in people's intuitions. Attempts to combat this error by adding a
slippage factor are rarely adequate, since the adjusted value tends to remain too close to the
initial value that acts as an anchor.") (citations omitted); Ernesto Blanco & Robert Folger, The
Planning Fallacy: The Cognitive Process 8 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Central Florida) (suggesting that "overoptimism vis-A-vis a future task is caused
by four main factors: (1) the temporal proximity of the task; people tend to be optimistically
biased when the outcome of their predictions is still far ahead in time, (2) the selection of the
goal; once the individual has selected a goal, he or she becomes overoptimistic in
implementing plans of action, (3) mental construction of scenarios; people tend to infer the
likelihood of an outcome on the basis of mental plans or scenarios about how the future will
unfold, often with greater optimism than the actual situation warrants, and (4) enhanced
motivational states; people may find incentives to be overoptimistic, like job promotions,
bonuses, and social recognition") (citing David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When
Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 339-43 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel
Kahneman eds., 2002)).
65. Derek J. Koehler & Connie S.K. Poon, Self-Predictions Overweight Strength of Current
Intentions, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 517, 522 (2006).
66. See id.; see also DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 134-37 (2006).
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These possible causes of the planning fallacy would be difficult
to ameliorate in the statutes of limitation context. One common
suggestion-improving recall of the duration of similar past
tasks6 7 -might help some people but not others. Contractors and
other nrofessinna1s estimating the duration of construction projects,
for example, might benefit from the suggestion. Plaintiffs who are
contemplating filing a lawsuit for the first-and perhaps only-time
in their lives, by contrast, probably would have no relevant experi-
ence to draw upon and so would not be helped by it. They would
have no idea how long it might take them to file a lawsuit (if they
were proceeding pro se), or how long it might take them to locate
and retain an attorney, and for the attorney to file a lawsuit (if they
were not proceeding pro se). Similarly, if the planning fallacy results
from people's reliance on oversimplified representations of future
tasks that ignore contextual factors that may interfere with timely
performance, experience with the task or sophistication in thinking
about the task would be crucial to accurate estimation of task
duration. Here again, plaintiffs (as distinguished from their counsel)
are unlikely to possess the requisite background or skills to estimate
task duration accurately.6" Finally, because underestimation of task
completion times is more pronounced for longer tasks than for
shorter tasks,69 the longer the limitation period, the more severe the
plaintiffs underestimation of the time required for filing is likely to
be. This is hardly surprising. The longer the duration of a task, the
grater the risk that obstacles to task completion will arise. More-
over, people typically have better information about near future
events than distant future events.70 The planning fallacy therefore
67. See Roy, Christenfeld & McKenzie, supra note 48, at 754-55.
68. See Tim Silk, Getting Started is Half the Battle: The Influence of Deadlines and Effort
on Consumer Self-Regulation to Redeem Rewards 8 (2005) (working paper, on file with the
Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia); see infra notes 127-39 and
accompanying text.
69. See Roy, Christenfeld & McKenzie, supra note 48, at 741 (citing Christopher D.B. Burt
& Simon Kemp, Construction of Activity Duration and Time Management Potential, 8 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 155 (1994) (explaining that while almost all experiments have found a
sizeable tendency to underestimate the duration of future tasks; the duration of very short
simple tasks, such as those requiring less than five minutes to complete, is more likely to be
overestimated than underestimated)).
70. See, e.g., Shiri Nussbaum, Nira Lieberman & Yaacov Trope, Predicting the Near and
Distant Future, 135 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 152, 152-53 (2006) ('remporal distance
from future outcomes ordinarily reduces the accuracy with which those outcomes can be
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suggests that plaintiffs will typically underestimate the duration of
the task of filing a lawsuit and are likely to misschedule their time
and miss the deadline.
One additional point should be noted. The Buehler, Griffin and
Ross experiment discussed earlier v' contained a fifth study in which
observers were asked to predict how long it would take participants
in Study 4 to complete their task.72 This made it possible for the
experimenters to compare the relative susceptibility of actors and
observers to the planning fallacy. The results of the fifth study were
that: "[u]nlike the actors, the observers tended to overestimate how
long it would take the actor to finish by approximately 31%.,'73 This
means that the estimates of the actors and the observers differed by
43 percent (31 percent overestimation by the observers combined
with 12 percent underestimation by the actors).74
Study 5 has important implications for designers of statutes of
limitation. It suggests that although plaintiffs are likely to underes-
timate the amount of time required to file a lawsuit, observers, such
as legislators, judges, and jurors, are likely to overestimate the time
required. Therefore, well-meaning legislators may establish limi-
tation periods that are unnecessarily long, and well-meaning judges
or kind-hearted jurors may evaluate the diligence of plaintiffs too
generously. Thus, the belief that plaintiffs need long limitation
periods in which to file their claims may be the product of cognitive
error. This is important because establishing longer limitation
periods actually may increase the risk that plaintiffs will miss the
filing deadline.75
C. Procrastination
Procrastination is familiar to most. It has been defined as
"voluntarily delay[ing] an intended course of action despite expect-
predicted.").
71. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
72. See Buehler, Griffin & Ross, Exploring the 'Planning Fallacy," supra note 54, at 377.
73. Roy, Christenfeld & McKenzie, supra note 48, at 739-40 (summarizing the results of
the fifth study conducted in Buehler, Griffin & Ross, Exploring the "Planning Fallacy,"supra
note 54, at 377-79).
74. See supra text accompanying note 55.
75. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
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ing to be worse off for the delay.""s Although procrastination is
sometimes defended,77 it typically is viewed as a negative trait.78
Procrastination is common. It has been estimated that "80%-95%
of college students engage in procrastination, approximately 75%
consider themselves procrastinators, and almost 50% procrastinate
consistently and problematically."79 Procrastination is so prevalent
that it is not unique to humans. Even pigeons will put off doing a
small amount of work now for a delayed reward, preferring instead
to do much more work later to obtain the same reward.8 °
76. Piers Steel, The Nature of Procrastination: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review
of Quintessential Self-Regulatory Failure, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 65, 66 (2007); see also
Chrisoula Andreou, Understanding Procrastination, 37 J. THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 183, 183
(2007) [hereinafter Andreou, Understanding Procrastination] ("I will count as cases of
procrastination only those cases of delaying in which one leaves too late or puts off
indefinitely what one should-relative to one's ends and information-have done sooner.")
(citation omitted).
77. See, e.g., PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK
15 (1996) ("[O]nce we act, we forfeit the option of waiting until new information comes along.
As a result, not-acting has value. The more uncertain the outcome, the greater may be the
value of procrastination.'); Gregory Schraw, Theresa Wadkins & Lori Olafson, Doing the
Things We Do: A Grounded Theory of Academic Procrastination, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 12, 21-
22 (2007) (arguing that student procrastination is an adaptive strategy designed to maximize
efficiency and other values). Some contend that when deferring action or choice is a value
maximizing response to a situation, it does not qualify as procrastination. E.g., Andreou,
Understanding Procrastination, supra note 76, at 183 (arguing that "when 'putting off' is
rational it isn't procrastination") (quoting Maury Silver & John Sabini, Procrastinating, 11
J. THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 207, 208 (1981)).
78. See, e.g., THE SIXTH ORATION OF M.T. CICERO AGAINST MARCUS ANTONIUS, reprinted
in 4 THE ORATIONS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 116, 119 (C. D. Yonge trans., Henry G. Bohn
1852) ("[1]n the conduct of almost every affair slowness and procrastination are hateful ....");
SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE RAMBLER NO. 134 (June 29, 1751), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF
SAMUEL JOHNSON, L.L.D. WITH AN ESSAY ON HIS LIFE AND GENIUS BY ARTHUR MURPHY, ESQ.
208, 208 (George Dearborn 1834) [hereinafter JOHNSON, THE RAMBLER No. 134] (describing
procrastination as "one of the general weaknesses, which, in spite of the instruction of
moralists, and the remonstrances of reason, prevail to a greater or less degree in every mind
.... "); Letter from Philip Stanhope, Lord of Chesterfield to His Son (Dec. 26, 1749), in 2
LETTERS WRITTEN BY THE LATE RIGHT HONOURABLE PHILIP DORMER STANHOPE, EARL OF
CHESTERFIELD TO HIS SON 162, 165 (3d ed., J. Rivington & H. Gaine 1775) ("No idleness, no
laziness, no procrastination: never put off till to-morrow what you can do to-day.").
79. Steel, supra note 76, at 65 (citations omitted).
80. See James E. Mazur, Procrastination by Pigeons with Fixed-Interval Response
Requirements, 69 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 185 (1998); James E. Mazur,
Procrastination by Pigeons: Preference for Larger, More Delayed Work Requirements, 65 J.
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 159 (1996).
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Procrastination also is not a new phenomenon. "Procrastination
has plagued human beings since at least the birth of civilization."'"
It does, however, appear to be increasing. An examination of holiday
credit card purchases predicted that five times more last-minute
Christmas shopping would occur in 1999 than in 1991.82
Various causes of procrastination have been suggested. Three of
the most widely accepted explanations are intertemporal discount-
ing, task averseness, and certain personality traits.83
Life frequently requires that people trade off present costs and
benefits against future costs and benefits.' This is commonly
referred to as "intertemporal choice."85 As one group of scholars
explained:
Intertemporal choice refers to a choice between options whose
consequences occur at different points in time. Examples of
intertemporal choice include: Receiving $10 today, or $12 in a
week, choosing between chocolate cake and fruit for dessert,
saving versus spending money now, promising to write a journal
article or teach an extra course in the next academic term,
choosing a major in college, and deciding whether to smoke a
cigarette. In each of these cases, a decision maker needs to trade
off the utility (or value) of one outcome that is temporally
proximal (typically immediate) with another one that is tempo-
rally distant. In the examples above, the proximal outcome is
$10, the taste of the chocolate cake, or the happiness derived
from current spending; the distant outcome is $12, the health
consequences of eating rich foods, or the hardships associated
with not saving enough for a rainy day.86
It turns out that "there is a remarkable consensus in the litera-
ture that future outcomes are discounted (or undervalued) relative
to immediate outcomes."87 The farther in the future an event is
81. Steel, supra note 76, at 84.
82. See Robert D. Hershey Jr., Many Shoppers Won't Do Today What They Can Do on Dec.
24, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, at BU12.
83. See Steel, supra note 76, at 67-68.
84. See Dilip Soman et al., The Psychology of Intertemporal Discounting: Why Are Distant
Events Valued Differently from Proximal Ones?, 16 MARKETING LETTERS 347, 347 (2005).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 348.
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expected to occur, the less impact it has on people's decisions and
behavior' As Samuel Johnson said, it is only natural for us "to be
most solicitous for that which is by its nearness enabled to make
the strongest impressions. " 9 This phenomenon, which is usually
referred to as "intertemporal discounting' or "positive time
preference,"'" is pervasive.
The lure of the present is powerful.9 Even when a distant future
reward is strongly desired, or a distant future penalty is deeply
dreaded, people may be unable to overcome the force of inter-
temporal discounting. In fact, it can lock people into a cycle of
procrastination from which they cannot easily escape. One philoso-
pher has offered the following example:
[T]he effects of smoking accumulate in a way that prompts
intransitive quitting preferences in those with both a taste for
cigarettes and a concern for decent health. More specifically,
since smoking a cigarette cannot take one from a state of decent
health to a state of poor health, but smoking very many can,
someone with a taste for cigarettes and a concern for decent
health is likely to invariably prefer both (1) having an extra
cigarette before finally quitting, and (2) quitting after a rela-
tively low number of cigarettes, such as 5,000, to quitting after
a very high number of cigarettes, such as 500,000.93
A person with both a persistent taste for cigarettes and an
enduring concern for decent health, then, may be trapped. He or
she may always prefer enjoying one more cigarette to the discomfort
of foregoing that one additional cigarette in the hope of enjoying
better health in the distant future. This occurs because people value
enjoying a small, certain, and immediate reward more highly than
88. See id. ("[A]n identical (positive) outcome will become increasingly attractive the closer
it is located in time to the time of decision-making.").
89. JOHNSON, THE RAMBLER No. 134, supra note 78, at 208.
90. Soman et al., supra note 84, at 348.
91. Gideon Keren & Peter Roelofsma, Immediacy and Certainty in Intertemporal Choice,
63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 287, 294 (1995).
92. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, TASSO (1790) ("The present moment is a powerful
goddess.") (quoted in THE OXFORD BOOK APHORISMS 348 (John Gross ed., Oxford University
Press 1987)).
93. Chrisoula Andreou, Environmental Preservation and Second-Order Procrastination,
35 PHIL. &PuB.AFF. 233,238-39 (2007) [hereinafter Andreou, Second-Order Procrastination].
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avoiding a larger, but uncertain and long-delayed, penalty.94 The
immediacy and certainty of the gratification associated with the
smaller reward overwhelms the deeply discounted value of the
larger uncertain and deferred penalty.95 If the increment by which
the larger penalty is diminished is the same at every point of choice,
and if the smoker's preferences remain stable, then he may find
himself locked in an enduring "preference loop,"' with the result
that he will never stop smoking.
A second prominent explanation for procrastination is task
averseness. If people find a task difficult or unpleasant, they are
likely to defer performance of that task and to choose to do some-
thing else instead. 7 "Consistently and strongly, the more people
dislike a task, the more they consider it effortful or anxiety produc-
ing, the more they procrastinate .... , Among other things, an
aversive task can make "ephemeral pleasures" (like watching a
television sitcom), and even "ephemeral chores" (like organizing
one's desk), seem unusually enticing."
Finally, studies have shown some association between procrasti-
nation and a variety of personality traits, such as fear of failure,
self-consciousness, high distractability, low achievement motivation,
impulsiveness, poor self-control, low conscientiousness, and so on,
1°°
although not all psychologists agree that a cause and effect rela-
tionship exists. 01 Some of these traits, such as impulsiveness and
low conscientiousness, may be related to high rates of intertemporal
discounting, so they may overlap with intertemporal discounting
as an explanation for procrastination. The importance of these
personality traits relative to intertemporal discounting and task
94. See Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 382 (2002).
95. Id.
96. See Andreou, Understanding Procrastination, supra note 76, at 187-89. This risk may
be higher if the future consequence is a loss or penalty than if it is a gain or reward, but it
applies regardless of the valence of the future consequence. See generally Frederick,
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 94, at 370 (arguing that "loss aversion reinforces time
discounting, creating a powerful aversion to delay [consumption]").
97. See Steel, supra note 76, at 68.
98. Id. at 75.
99. Andreou, Understanding Procrastination, supra note 76, at 189 (citing Silver & Sabini,
supra note 77, at 214).
100. See Steel, supra note 76, at 75-79, 81.
101. See Schraw, Wadkins & Olafson, supra note 77, at 21-23.
630 [Vol. 50:607
PROCRASTINATION
averseness as potential causes of procrastination is not well
understood.102
The implications of what we know about procrastination and its
causes for statutes of limitation can be summarized as follows.
Many people procrastinate. Some do so in part because of personal-
ity traits,"3 which the justice system cannot realistically expect to
change, and that therefore must be acknowledged as a characteristic
that many plaintiffs are likely to share. The task of filing a
lawsuit-or even simply hiring a lawyer-is one that many people
probably would find unpleasant.°4 It is unfamiliar and intimidating,
and it might require either the immediate expenditure of money or
making an immediate commitment to pay money in the future.
Thus, we can expect that it would be a task that many plaintiffs
would be inclined to put off. Further, these characteristics of filing
a lawsuit would be difficult to change. Altering them in a significant
way would entail, among other things, overhauling the litigation
process and the ways in which lawyers are retained and compen-
sated.' Finally, the outcome of litigation is something that
ordinarily will be perceived as occurring in the distant future. Even
in efficient courts with small caseloads it can take a year or two for
a lawsuit to be resolved, whether by settlement or adjudication. 16
In larger or less efficient courts, it may take considerably longer.
Moreover, there is a popular perception that court proceedings are
102. See id. at 23 ("[O]ur findings are inconsistent with claims that procrastination is
caused by fear of failure or laziness .... ").
103. See Steel, supra note 76, at 68-70.
104. See Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach the Heart of the Matter (Nov.
17, 1921), in 3 LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 89, 105 (1926) ("[A]s a litigant, I should dread a
lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.").
105. While it may be difficult to reduce the complexity and averseness of filing a lawsuit,
it may be worth taking some steps in that direction. Unfamiliar, complex, or unpleasant tasks
may trigger second-order procrastination. Second-order procrastination means postponing
planning about how to proceed with a task, thus delaying even starting on the task, and
compounding delay in task completion. See Andreou, Second-Order Procrastination, supra
note 93, at 243-44. For the intimidated or poorly educated, even finding out how to approach
the task of filing a lawsuit might itself be aversive. Relatively inexpensive steps to make the
process easier, such as an informational 800 telephone number or a widely publicized
informational website, might be beneficial.
106. See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposed Remedy for Mississippi's Medical Malpractice
Miseries, 22 Miss. C. L. REV. 1, 2 ("[Ihe average tort lawsuit reaches trial years after it is
fied.") (citation omitted).
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complex and prolonged."0 7 Thus, the process of filing a lawsuit is
both an aversive task and one in which there are up-front costs-at
least the cost of deferring leisure or other preferred activities, and
perhaps the cost of incurring litigation expenses and stress as
well-and the prospect of, at best, a long-delayed reward of an
uncertain amount. This may increase the likelihood that even a
plaintiff who wants to file a lawsuit rather than forfeit her claim
will become locked into a cycle of going to the beach day after day
rather than foregoing that pleasure and hunting for a lawyer
instead. Accordingly, the task of filing a lawsuit triggers inter-
temporal discounting and task aversion, two of the three most
significant causes of procrastination.0 8 The result is that many
people predictably will wait until the deadline for filing a lawsuit is
imminent before taking action, and having underestimated the
amount of time and effort required to complete the task because of
the planning fallacy, may be vulnerable to missing the deadline and
forfeiting their claims.
D. Deadlines
The typical strategy for attempting to overcome procrastination
is the imposition of a deadline.' 9 A deadline is "[a] line that does not
move or run.""0 The term also possesses the connotation that
107. See, e.g., CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971)
(1853).
108. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
109. See Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 157 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We live in a world
of deadlines. If we're late for the start of the game or move, or late for the departure of the
plane or train, things go forward without us.").
110. 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY 290 (2d ed. 1989).
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negative consequences will occur if the line is transgressed.11' The
way deadlines work is illustrated by the following example:
[Tom] is a college student who has been assigned an essay on
September 15th, the start of a semester, due on December 15th,
when the course ends.... Tom has two choices over the course of
his semester: studying or socializing. Tom likes to socialize, but
he likes to get good grades even more. However, because the
positive component of socializing is perpetually in the present,
it maintains a uniformly high utility evaluation. The reward of
writing is initially temporally distant, diminishing its utility.
Only toward the deadline do the effects of discounting decrease,
and writing becomes increasingly likely."2
Because of this mechanism, it is widely believed that deadlines are
effective in reducing delay or procrastination in task completion,"'
and they are commonly employed. Statutes of limitation are an
obvious example.
Deciding to create a deadline, however, is only the first step. Not
all deadlines possess the same structure. Once the decision to
impose a deadline is made, choices about the design of that deadline
also must be made. These choices include resolving such issues as:
111. The first use of the term may have referred to a fishing line that was baited with dead
rather than live bait (so that it did not move), or that was weighted so that it would remain
stationary in the water. See id. Shortly thereafter, the term was used to refer to a rope line
placed seventeen feet inside the perimeter of the stockade wall at the Andersonville, Georgia
prison camp during the American Civil War. BENSONJ. LOSSING, 3 PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 600 (1868) ("[S]eventeen feet from the inner
stockade was the 'dead-line,' over which no man could pass and live."); see also OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 110 (quoting 44 CONG. REc. 358, 384 (1876)) (referring to
the "dead line,' beyond which the prisoners are not allowed to pass."). Eventually, the term
was used to denote limits on time as well as space, such as a point in time by which a
newspaper story had to be completed. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 110.
112. Steel, supra note 76, at 71. Although this example illustrates the effect of deadlines
on intertemporal discounting, they mitigate the effects of task averseness or problematic
personality traits in exactly the same ways. As the deadline (and the associated penalty)
approaches, the adverse consequences of missing the deadline overwhelm the benefits of
postponing the task, and procrastination frequently ceases.
113. See, e.g., Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 2, at 948 (reporting that "deadlines do
shorten the time frame in which agencies issue policy"); Alvin E. Roth, J. Keith Murnighan
& Francoise Schoumaker, The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence,
78 AM. ECON. REV. 806, 822 (1988) (concluding that "one of the clearest phenomena to emerge
from the [bargaining experiments] discussed here is a 'deadline effect': a very high percentage
of agreements are reached very close to the end, just before the deadline").
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(1) whether the deadline should be externally-imposed or self-
imposed; (2) whether the period allowed for task completion should
be long or short; and (3) whether there should be one, end-of-period
deadline or multiple, evenly-spaced deadlines.
For example, a plausible response to the likelihood that many
plaintiffs will procrastinate in filing suit might be to lengthen the
deadline in order to minimize the risk that the deadline will be
missed. In fact, this approach has been widely employed in the
context of statutes of limitation. Over the last twenty-five years,
nearly all of the amendments to statutes of limitation have length-
ened their duration." 4 Similarly, contractual provisions purporting
to shorten the duration of limitation periods frequently are rejected
as unconscionable. 115
This intuition, however, may be unsound. In particular, lengthen-
ing limitation periods or other deadlines may be ineffective or make
matters worse. First, rather than ensuring that a deadline is met,
a long deadline may simply delay performance of the task without
avoiding the last minute rush that can lead to missing the deadline.
Psychologists have identified a phenomenon they call the "student
syndrome.""'  When people have more time than necessary to
complete a task, they treat the extra time as a margin of safety that
will help ensure that they meet the deadline." 7 Unfortunately,
rather than beginning the task right away and reserving the safety
margin to cover unexpected interruptions, unanticipated obstacles,
equipment failure, and the like, people typically consume the safety
margin first, delaying beginning the task until only the minimum
amount of time required to complete the task under the most
favorable conditions remains." ' The result is that they often miss
the deadline because they underestimate the time required for task
114. See Steve Seidenberg, Time's Running Out for Time Limits, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Sept.
2003, at 4.4 ("There is a trend for states to lengthen or eliminate their statutes of
limitations.") (quoting Evan Lee); see also O'Neal, supra note 24, at 107, 124 (describing the
erosion of the date-of-injury rule of accrual in favor of the discovery rule of accrual because
the latter is more generous to plaintiffs than the former).
115. See, e.g., Davis v. O'Melveny & Myers, L.L.C., 485 F.3d 1066, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding unconscionable a one-year limitation period). But see Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co.,
258 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that, as a general matter, a consensual six-
month limitation period is not unreasonably short).
116. See ELIYAHu M. GOLDRATT, CRITICAL CHAIN: A BusINEss NOVEL 24 (1997).
117. See id.
118. See id.
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completion, regardless of how much extra time they were allowed at
the outset."n Therefore, lengthening the limitation period may have
little or no effect in terms of preserving claims, but would definitely
lengthen the period between the lawsuit generating event (or
discovery thereof) and the filing of the lawsuit. Second, a generous
deadline may decrease the likelihood that the task will be completed
at all. 2 ° A long period may appear like a period with no deadline.
At best, it may stimulate the creation of self-imposed deadlines,
which research suggests are less effective than externally-imposed
deadlines.' Third, we may be overestimating the time required to
file a lawsuit. 2 If so, extending the duration of limitation periods
may inadvertently reduce the number of lawsuits filed and unneces-
sarily compromise the purposes of statutes of limitation.
In one study, college students were asked to answer and return
a questionnaire in exchange for a five-dollar reward. 123 They were
divided into three groups, each of which received a different
deadline. The duration of the deadline significantly affected the
percentage of the students who answered the questionnaire and
collected their reward. About 60 percent of the students with a five-
day deadline completed the questionnaire and received the five
dollar reward, compared with only 42 percent with a twenty-one-day
deadline. 124 The worst performers of all were those in the group that
was not assigned a deadline. Only 25 percent of the students with
no deadline completed the questionnaire and received a reward.
25
The experimenters concluded that "the more time people had to
complete the task, the less likely they were to do it.'
12s
A later, more elaborate study yielded similar results.'27 In this
experiment, college students were asked to choose among three
options: (1) buying two movie tickets at the reduced price of eleven
dollars (the normal price was twelve dollars); (2) buying two movie
119. See id.
120. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
123. Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred
Decision, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 358, 361 (1992).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally Silk, supra note 68.
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tickets for an increased price of thirteen dollars (the normal price
was twelve dollars), less a six dollar (or nine dollar) mail-in rebate;
or (3) buying no movie tickets.' The deadline for rebate redemption
was either one day, seven days, or twenty-one days.'29 One hundred
eighty-four students purchased the rebate offer, and the net
redemption rate by those who purchased the rebate offer was 59
percent.1
30
What the experimenter wanted to determine was whether varying
duration of the deadline would affect the percentage of students
applying for the mail-in rebate, their delay in initiating the
application process, and their delay in completing the application
process.13' The longer the deadline, he found, the smaller the
number of students who applied for the mail-in rebate.132 In the
group assigned a deadline of one day, 77 percent applied for the
rebate, while only 70 percent of those assigned a seven-day deadline
did so.133 The group assigned the twenty-one-day deadline was the
least likely to apply for the rebate. Just 59 percent of the students
in that condition bothered to apply."' The results also showed that
the longer the deadline, the greater the delay both in beginning the
process of applying for a rebate and in completing that process once
it was begun.13' The conclusion was that "shorter deadlines can
increase redemption rates by mitigating the influence of procrastina-
tion.,,13' The study also suggests that not only do longer deadlines
result in lower rates of task completion, but they also increase delay
both in beginning the task and in completing the task once it has
been started."7
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id. at 14.
130. Id. at 18.
131. Id. at 11-12.
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id. at 36 fig.4B.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 18-19.
136. Id. at 12-27. Whether this difference between longer and shorter deadlines would
persist if both the longer and shorter periods possessed a more extended duration (say, one
year and two years), a situation more analogous to statutes of limitation, apparently has not
been studied. Nevertheless, there is no reason to expect that a trend of declining applications
over time would suddenly reverse itself.
137. Id. This indicates that conventional assumptions on which some analyses of statutes
of limitation are based may be flawed. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miceli, Deterrence, Litigation Costs,
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Interestingly, it did not matter whether the amount of the rebate
was smaller or larger: in either case, the redemption rate was about
the same. 13 Even more surprising was the finding that varying the
difficulty of the application process revealed a "backlash" effect:
those who confronted a more challenging application process were
actually more likely to complete that process than those who faced
an easier application process.
139
Both the Tversky and Shafir study and the Silk study utilized a
single, end-of-period deadline. A different study, which was con-
ducted by Ariely and Wertenbroch, explored the question whether
multiple, evenly-spaced deadlines might work better than a single,
end-of-period deadline. 4 ° In that experiment, students were
recruited to proofread papers.' Payment was contingent on the
quality of the proofreading (ten cents were paid for each correctly
detected error) and timely completion (a one dollar penalty was
imposed for each day of delay in completing the project).' Sixty
students participated in the study.'43 They were randomly assigned
to three conditions."4 In the evenly-spaced deadline condition,
participants were required to submit one of the three texts they
had proofread every seven days. 4 ' In the end-of-period-deadline
condition, the participants were required to submit all three texts
within twenty-one days.'46 In the self-imposed deadline condition,
the participants were allowed to choose their own deadline for each
and the Statute of Limitations for Tort Suits, 20 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 383, 393 (2000)
(asserting that "a longer statute [of limitations] enhances deterrence by confronting injurers
with more lawsuits"); see also Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral
Economics of Consumer Rebates, 12 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 362, 415-16 (2007) ("Although most
consumers might express a preference for long task completion deadlines, ... scholarly work
actually supports a different, counterintuitive notion that longer deadlines may lead to
increased breakage and that shorter deadlines might increase rebate redemption. Regulators,
therefore, might want to consider mandating shorter redemption deadlines.") (citations
omitted).
138. Silk, supra note 68, at 36 fig.4B.
139. Id. at 29-30.
140. Dan Ariely & Klaus Westenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-
Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 222 (2002).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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of the three texts, provided that all three had to be submitted within
twenty-one days. 4 7 The results were that those assigned to the
evenly-spaced deadline condition experienced fewer delays in
submissions, performed better on the task by correctly detecting
more grammatical mistakes, and enjoyed higher earnings than
those in the end-of-period-deadline condition. 4 ' Although the
students who operated under the self-imposed deadline condition
also outperformed those in the end-of-period-deadline condition in
all three dimensions, they underperformed those in the externally
imposed evenly-spaced deadline condition. 4 s The upshot of this is
not just that deadlines matter, but also that the structure of
deadlines matters.
The Silk study and the Tversky and Shafir study both involved
situations analogous to the conditions in which statutes of limita-
tion operate. In both studies, the subjects were like plaintiffs in that
they were given the opportunity to apply for a monetary reward.
Further, in both studies, the penalty for missing a deadline was loss
of the entire potential award.
The Ariely and Wertenboch study, by contrast, is not quite as
analogous. The task involved in that experiment-proofreading
three papers-could easily be divided into three discrete tasks.
Filing a lawsuit could be viewed in the same way-that is, it could
be divided up into a series of steps, such as contacting a lawyer,
retaining a lawyer, etc.-but those events would be difficult for the
justice system to monitor, and a different but parallel set of steps
would have to be designed for pro se litigants. On the other hand,
like the Silk study and the Tversky and Shafir study, the Ariely and
Wertenboch study required participants to complete a task in order
to obtain a reward, a situation analogous to the situation accompa-
nied by a plaintiff contemplating filing a lawsuit.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 223.
149. Id. at 222-23; see also Charles Vlek & Gideon Keren, Behavioral Decision Theory and
Environmental Risk Management: Assessment and Resolution of Four 'Survival' Dilemmas,
80 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 249, 264 (1992) ("One possibility is to decrease the psychological
distance to the future, e.g., by making the future more salient, 'now.' Part of this strategy
might amount to... 'proximal goal setting': the breaking up of a long-term goal into successive
steps to be achieved at moments lying much closer to the present and to one another." (citing
ALBERT BANDURA, SocIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977))).
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E. Summary
The research summarized above teaches several lessons about
how people actually behave and respond to deadlines that are
relevant to the design of statutes of limitation. First, deadlines
improve performance. Those working under a deadline are more
likely to complete the task and obtain a reward or avoid a penalty
than those working without one. They are also likely to complete the
task earlier than those working without a deadline. Second,
although a self-imposed deadline is better than no deadline at all,
externally-imposed deadlines are more effective than self-imposed
deadlines in reducing delay and promoting task completion. Third,
not all deadline structures are equally effective. The shorter the
deadline, the more likely people are to complete a task and claim
their reward, whether the reward takes the form of a payment or a
partial refund of the purchase price. Shorter deadlines also result
in fewer missed deadlines than do longer deadlines. Further,
multiple, evenly-spaced deadlines reduce delay or procrastination
more effectively than a single, end-of-period deadline. Fourth, losses
and penalties provide stronger incentives than gains and rewards.
People experience at least twice as much displeasure from losing
$100 as the pleasure they would experience from gaining $100.
Fifth, people are vulnerable to the planning fallacy. They consis-
tently underestimate how long it will take to complete tasks, even
when they have missed deadlines while performing similar tasks in
the past. Sixth, people discount the future relative to the present. In
particular, even large distant future gains are ineffective in
overcoming small increments of immediate gain.
This means that the following principles should guide the design
of a limitation system: (1) statutes of limitation should be used to
externally impose filing deadlines; (2) the deadline provided by a
statute of limitation should be shorter rather than longer; (3) each
statute of limitation should consist of multiple, evenly-spaced dead-
lines rather than simply one, end-of-period deadline; (4) plaintiffs
should be penalized for missing the statute of limitation deadline
rather than rewarded for meeting it; (5) a plaintiff should not lose
all of the value of a claim simply for missing one deadline; and (6)
the discounted future penalty associated with each evenly-spaced
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deadline contained in a statute of limitation should be sufficiently
painful to overcome the undiscounted present reward for not filing.
III. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES
A. Varying the Burden of Persuasion
One possible alternative structure for statutes of limitation would
be to vary the burden of persuasion depending upon how promptly
a claim is filed. Specifically, the level of confidence required could be
raised over time: plaintiffs who wait until late in the limitation
period would be required to provide more persuasive evidence in
support of their claims than those who file early in the limitation
period. As an example, assume a limitation period of three years
duration. 50 A plaintiff who filed within one year would be required
merely to prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. A
plaintiff who filed between one year and two years, however, would
be required to prove her claim by clear and convincing evidence.
Finally, a plaintiff who filed between two years and three years
would be required to prove her claim beyond a reasonable doubt.
Claims not filed within three years would be extinguished.
This possible change has much to recommend it. It is incremental
in nature, so the harshness of the all-or-nothing approach is
mitigated. It also possesses many of the characteristics which
psychologists suggest a good deadline structure should have. A
further advantage of this approach is that it simultaneously
punishes untimely filing by disadvantaging tardy plaintiffs and
compensates defendants for the risk that they will be unfairly
prejudiced by the deterioration of evidence resulting from the
plaintiff's delay.
Tinkering with burdens of persuasion, however, may impose
costs. Burdens of persuasion are defined and allocated based on a
variety of considerations, including such matters as convenience,
access to evidence, and the types of adjudicative error we most want
to minimize. 5' The level of confidence required rests on societal
150. This is a common period length. See, e.g., CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 338(d) (West 2008)
(providing a three-year period for fraud).
151. See 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (6th ed. 2006).
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judgments about the costs of litigation errors and the optimal
allocation of those costs among plaintiffs and defendants in civil
cases.15 ' Tampering with the burden of persuasion to accomplish
purposes external to the law of evidence or the substantive law,
such as the promotion of a limitation of actions policy, indirectly
compromises their ability to accomplish their own internal pur-
poses.
A second problem with manipulating burdens of persuasion as a
way of creating a more sophisticated limitation system is that
although the scheme seems simple, there is little consensus about
what the three levels of persuasion actually mean.153 They are
widely viewed as "awkward vehicles" for expressing the level of
confidence required.' Studies show that there is wide variation in
the percentage of certainty people attribute to each of the three
burdens of persuasion.155 The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
might mean 80 percent sure to one person and 99 percent sure to
another. Therefore, the detriment imposed by the higher burden
would be uncertain and would vary among factfinders.
A third problem with varying burdens of persuasion is that it
would be difficult to confirm that the scheme had been implemented
correctly. Even assuming that the three levels of persuasion had
roughly the same meaning for most people, there would be no way
152. Cf. Donald Wittman, Two Views of Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 253 (1974) ("In
criminal cases the standard of proof needed to convict a defendant is proof 'beyond a
reasonable doubt.' The error rate of the trial is thus extremely biased in favor of the defendant
[the probability of finding a guilty man innocent is much greater than the probability of
finding an innocent man guilty]. In contrast, in civil cases the standard of proof is usually the
'preponderance of the evidence' or 'more likely than not' standard, resulting in an error rate
that is almost totally unbiased [the probability of finding an innocent man guilty is almost the
same as the probability of finding a guilty man innocent].").
153. MCCORMICK, supra note 151, § 339-41.
154. Id. § 339.
155. See Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof" A Vew from the
Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 319, 325 (1971) (finding that when
asked to express the level of belief required in terms of probabilities, jurors had a very
different understanding of the phrase "preponderance of the evidence" than did judges, and
that they believed the level of certainty required to satisfy that standard was far higher);
Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About
Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REv. 105, 126-29 (1999) (reporting numerous studies showing
variation in the interpretation of the degree of certainty required by the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of persuasion; concluding that most judges surveyed thought the probability
of guilt had to be in the 85 to 95 percent level of confidence, whereas most jurors concluded
that a level of confidence of between 61 percent and 81 percent was required).
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of confirming that judges or jurors actually applied the intended
burden of persuasion, even if they had attempted to. A juror, or even
a judge, might believe that she is applying the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard to a tardy but extremely sympathetic and deserv-
ing plaintiff, even though she actually is applying a lower burden
of persuasion. Moreover, because the process is internal, external
validation is impossible. As a result, fact-finder nullification prob-
ably would be both likely and undetectable.
A fourth difficulty with varying the burden of persuasion to
provide an incentive for prompt filing is that the technique is
already used to implement other goals. Although the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard is seldom used in civil cases, 15 6 the
"clear and convincing" standard occasionally is used to raise the
level of certainty required where a claim is disfavored on policy
grounds, presents a special danger of undetectable deception by the
plaintiff, or poses an especially grave risk to an important liberty
interest.57 Using this technique to improve statutes of limitation
would interfere with those existing schemes. Relatedly, because the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard already is constitutionally
required in all criminal cases,1 58 varying the burden of persuasion
as a way of implementing the statute of limitation in criminal cases
would not be possible. This would require handling limitation of
actions differently in civil cases than in criminal cases. While
adopting a different statute of limitation structure for criminal
cases than for civil cases might make sense, it would also add
complexity.
The final problem with varying burdens of persuasion is related
to the second. Even when future losses or benefits are clearly
delineated, people still discount them steeply. If future gains or
losses are only vaguely described, people probably will discount
them even more steeply relative to more concrete present gains and
losses. 59 As an example, a plaintiff who risks the loss of a claim
156. MCCORMICK, supra note 151, § 341.
157. Id. § 340.
158. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
159. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 349 (1984); Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 39, at 265
(defining the "certainty effect" as the principle that "people overweigh outcomes that are
considered certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable").
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with an estimated value of $100,000 by filing late probably feels a
stronger incentive to meet the filing deadline than one who merely
risks having to satisfy a different and arguably higher, but vaguely
described, standard of proof."6 Because the difference between, for
example, the clear and convincing evidence standard and the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard is vague, the change from one to the
other may not create a strong incentive for prompt filing.
In light of these difficulties, varying burdens of persuasion as a
mechanism for implementing an incremental approach to statutes
of limitation probably would not work well.16'
B. Depreciating the Value of the Claim
A more promising approach would be to penalize plaintiffs for
delay in filing by gradually decreasing the value of their claims. The
most straightforward application of this principle would be a small
reduction in the value of the claim for each day that passes between
the accrual of the claim and its eventual extinguishment. As an
example, assume a limitation period of four years or 1460 days. 6 2
The value of the plaintiffs claim might be decreased by 1/1460 per
day until the plaintiffs claim was extinguished. Specifically, if the
plaintiff filed before the limitation period expired, the amount of the
plaintiffs damages recovery could be reduced by multiplying the
amount awarded by the fact-finder by a fraction, the numerator of
which would be the number of days of the limitation period that had
elapsed, and the denominator of which would be the total number
of days in the limitation period. Therefore, a plaintiff who delayed
for two years after accrual of its claim before filing suit would have
its damages award reduced by multiplying the amount of the award
by 730/1460, or 50 percent.
160. On the other hand, civil plaintiffs usually do not know whether they will prevail, and
often do not know how much money they will receive if they prevail or when they will receive
the money. Therefore, reducing the amount of money they will receive may not send a strong
signal about the importance of promptness either.
161. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1183 ("In the end no manipulation of the burdens of
proof, the rules of admissibility, or the discretion of the jury works as well or efficiently as a
simple rule that forces a plaintiff to sue early in the process or forever hold his peace.").
162. I am not proposing that limitation periods have any particular duration. That issue
lies beyond the scope of this Article. The examples I use are merely intended to illustrate the
structural change I am suggesting.
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One refinement is necessary. Some part of the limitation period
should be excluded before the value of the claim would begin to be
reduced on a daily basis. Certainly, it is reasonable to allow
plaintiffs some period of time to prepare for filing suit without
penalty. Whether this span of time should be 30 days or 90 days or
180 days or even longer is debatable, but it makes sense to exclude
a reasonable period of time immediately following accrual because
it seems unrealistic to characterize that as delay on plaintiffs part.
I suggest that one year is the appropriate penalty-free time period.
This should give almost all plaintiffs ample time to file their claims,
and its simplicity makes it easy for everyone to remember and
apply.
There is reason to doubt, however, that daily discounting of the
value of claims would work optimally. Although a continuous
stream of tiny identical daily penalties is aesthetically pleasing, we
need a penalty structure that will be effective in combating
procrastination. As research has shown, because people discount the
future at high rates, the steady but noiseless daily accrual of small
reductions in the amount of damages that may be awarded in the
future probably will be overshadowed even by smaller daily
immediate rewards of not filing, and thus will provide an insuffi-
cient incentive for prompt filing.163
In order to avoid this problem, another refinement is required.
There should be a series of penalties imposed in periodic steps, and
the penalty associated with each step should be large enough to be
noticeable and to outweigh the small daily benefits of avoidance or
postponement, even when intertemporal discounting is considered.
As an example, assume a four-year limitation period. The value of
the plaintiffs claim would remain at 100 percent if it is filed at any
point between accrual and the expiration of one year, but would be
reduced to 75 percent of its value if it is filed between year one and
year two, to 50 percent if it is filed between year two and year three,
and to 25 percent if it is filed between year three and year four."
163. See supra Part II.A.
164. Research regarding the way in which people understand fractions suggests that these
discounts might better be described as a reduction of 25 cents for every dollar of claim value,
or the like. See Gary L. Brase, Which Statistical Formats Facilitate What Decisions? The
Perception and Influence of Different Statistical Information Formats, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 381 (2002).
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After the fourth anniversary of the accrual date, the claim would be
extinguished.'65 This new structure would provide the plaintiff with
a reasonable amount of time, such as one year, within which to file
a lawsuit without suffering any penalty whatsoever for delay.
Thereafter, the plaintiff would suffer a significant, but not draco-
nian, penalty for each additional year of delay. It might be described
as replacing one deadline with a series of "harmlines."
Experience from a different context suggests that such an
approach would work. Some teachers use the following grading
structure to encourage students to turn in their assignments early
in the semester instead of waiting until the last minute, exactly the
effect we are aiming for in the limitation of actions context. If an
assignment is turned in before March 1, the student will begin with
an A, and then be marked down from there during the grading
process. If the assignment is turned in after March 1 but before
April 1, the student will begin with a B, and then be marked down
from there. If the assignment is turned in after April 1 but before
May 1, the student will begin with a C, and then be marked down
from there. Finally, if the paper is not turned in by June 1, the
student will receive an F on the assignment. Teachers probably
would not have adopted this structure so widely unless it was
effective in reducing procrastination and appropriately balanced
promptness with fairness to students.
C. The Guttel and Novick Proposal
Two scholars have suggested a fresh approach to statutes of
limitation that rests in part on concepts similar to those underlying
mine.'66 They also propose jettisoning the all-or-nothing structure
of statutes of limitation, but in a different manner. As they explain:
The rule we advance never entirely bars the claim. Instead, it
extracts a price that compensates the defendant for his eviden-
165. In my example, the loss of value is the same at each step. It would be possible, of
course, to increase or decrease the percentage discount during each subsequent period. It also
would be possible to apply a different pattern of discounting, depending on the type of claim
involved. All of these approaches, however, would make the structure more complicated,
something that is highly undesirable in this particular area of law.
166. Guttel & Novick, supra note 31.
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tiary loss. This price consists of the total damages claimed by the
plaintiff, discounted by the probabilistic value of the lost
evidence. Thus, for example, if decay in the exculpatory evidence
doubles the plaintiffs chance of winning the case, from a
baseline of 30 per cent to 60 per cent, the proposed model halves
her potential damages. 67
The Guttel and Novick proposal is creative. Like mine, it
recommends a gradual, rather than avulsive, reduction in the value
of the plaintiffs claim.' By ignoring the reasons for the plaintiffs
delay, it also neatly sidesteps many of the practical problems
that arise in applying statutes of limitation.'69 Finally, it aims to
motivate plaintiffs to file promptly by imposing a penalty, and the
amount of that penalty is measured by the amount of harm actually
caused by the delay in filing. These are important strengths.
On the other hand, their proposal possesses flaws. First, it
assumes that delay prejudices only the defendant, and not the
plaintiff. This is untrue. The plaintiff bears the burden of persua-
sion on the elements of her claim. If, due to faded memories or lost
documents, the surviving evidence is unconvincing, delay is likely
to hurt the plaintiff at least as much as, if not more than, it hurts
the defendant. 7 '
Second, statutes of limitation have several purposes. The Guttel
and Novick proposal addresses just one of them: avoiding the
deterioration of evidence. It does nothing to address the other
purposes unless they happen to coincide with the deterioration of
evidence. Sometimes they will, but sometimes they will not. For
example, evidence may decay either more rapidly or more slowly
than societal standards evolve, yet avoiding the retrospective
167. Id. at 132-33.
168. In this respect, it lends support to the incremental approach I am suggesting.
169. See Guttel & Novick, supra note 31, at 133.
170. Plaintiffs, not just defendants, can be hurt by the deterioration of evidence. See
William Swadling, Limitation, in BREACH OF TRUST 319 (Peter Birks & Arianna Pretto eds.,
2002) ("When cases (as they often do) depend predominately on the recollection of witnesses,
delay can often be most prejudicial to defendants and to plaintiffs also. Witnesses'
recollections grow dim with the passage of time and the evidence of honest men differ sharply
on the relevant facts. In some cases it is sometimes impossible for justice to be done because
of the extreme difficulty in deciding which version of the facts is to be preferred ..... ) (quoting
Birkett v. James, [1978] A.C. 297, 327 (H.L.) (Salmon, L.)); Ochoa & Wistrich, Puzzling
Purposes, supra note 15, at 471-72.
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application of contemporary standards is one of the purposes of
statutes of limitation. 7' In addition, their proposal abandons any
pretense of promoting repose-another important purpose of
statutes of limitation' 72-by explicitly permitting the plaintiff "to
file her claim at any point.'
'7
Third, the determination of prejudice seems impractical. Assess-
ing the probative value of evidence that no longer exists presents an
intractable problem. What would a witness who has died have said?
What would documents that were destroyed have revealed? How, if
at all, might the fact-finder's decision have differed if that additional
evidence had been presented? These issues cause problems in the
spoliation of evidence context,174 and in the speedy trial context.
75
They likely would do so in this context as well.
Fourth, most cases settle, and few are tried. 76 This is widely
thought to be socially beneficial, 77 and, as presently structured, the
justice system both encourages and depends on a high settlement
rate. Any proposal for reforming statutes of limitation must take
account of this reality. Predictable litigation outcomes promote
settlement, and unpredictable litigation outcomes discourage
settlement. 78 Because the prejudice determination that Guttel and
Novick propose would be highly unpredictable, it would provide a
poor platform for settlement bargaining. Therefore, it probably
171. See Ochoa & Wistrich, Puzzling Purposes, supra note 15, at 493-95.
172. See id. at 460-71.
173. Guttel & Novick, supra note 31, at 178.
174. See 7 JAMES W. MOORE, ETAL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 37A.12[5][6][iii] (3d ed.
2006). Indeed, a common approach to spoliation is to abandon the effort to adjudicate the
merits altogether. See, e.g., Telectron, Inc. v. Overhead Door Corp., 116 F.R.D. 107, 126 (S.D.
Fla. 1987) (entering default judgment against a defendant after its corporate counsel
destroyed documents responsive to a pending discovery request that would have supported
the plaintiffs allegations).
175. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992) (noting that "time's erosion of
exculpatory evidence and testimony 'can rarely be shown,' ... compromis[ing] the reliability
of trial in ways that neither party can move, or for that matter, identify) (quoting Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)).
176. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1387 (1994) ("[Mlost litigation results in
settlement.").
177. Id. at 1350-51.
178. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 399, 423 (1973) ("[A] reduction in the variance between the
parties' estimates of the probability of prevailing and the true probability will [generally]
increase the settlement rate.").
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would inhibit settlement in cases in which the plaintiff delayed
appreciably in filing suit.
Fifth, the Guttel and Novick proposal does not provide plaintiffs
with a strong incentive for early filing. Its focus is entirely ex
post-that is, on correcting unfairness to the defendant that was
caused by the deterioration of evidence. But plaintiffs deciding
when to file their claims do not know how much evidence will be
lost with each passing day or how a court will assess the probative
value of that lost evidence. So, while plaintiffs under the Guttel and
Novick proposal may know that they are running some risk that
the value of their claims may be diminished by delay in filing,
rational plaintiffs may be unable to quantify that risk, and irratio-
nal plaintiffs may tend to undervalue that risk because it is not
concrete, and thus may become locked into a cycle of procrastina-
tion. 79
For these reasons, the Guttel and Novick proposal is less at-
tractive than the incremental approach I have advanced. My
proposal avoids most of these problems. It promotes all of the
purposes of statutes of limitation, and it does so in a simple and
straightforward manner that is knowable ex ante. Whatever the
plaintiff recovers is reduced by a percentage that increases as the
plaintiffs delay lengthens. This means that the implementation of
the incremental approach is easy and predictable, that it provides
an effective incentive for prompt filing, and that it supplies a sound
platform for settlement negotiations.
179. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text; see also Vlek & Keren, supra note 149,
at 264 (suggesting that positive time preference may be mitigated if policy promulgators
"make expected losses, appear certain [so] they will figure on the 'debt' side of the decision
maker's mental account; thereby [s]he would be more inclined to sacrifice something now in
order to avoid the future losses").
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE INCREMENTAL APPROACH
A. Advantages
1. Encourages Plaintiffs To File Early in the Limitation Period
The incremental approach to statutes of limitation would better
achieve the important policies providing strong support for limiting
civil actions than the present structure. It would promote repose in
all of the four senses identified above. 80 It would minimize deterio-
ration of evidence, thereby maximizing the accuracy of fact-finding
and minimizing litigation costs. It would encourage the prompt
enforcement of substantive law, thus strengthening both compensa-
tion and deterrence. And it would enhance fairness to defendants,
by avoiding the retrospective application of contemporary stan-
dards. All of these purposes would be better served because the
structure of the incremental approach encourages plaintiffs to file
within the first year of the limitation period in a way that the
present structure of the limitation system does not. Finally, the
incremental approach also furthers the goal of vindicating meritori-
ous claims by discouraging procrastination and by giving plaintiffs
more than one chance to meet the filing deadline before their claims
are extinguished.
2. Utilizes Empirical Data from Psychology
The incremental approach is not based on assumptions of
rationality, wishful thinking, misguided intuition, or outmoded
understandings of human behavior.'' Instead, it takes advantage
of what psychologists have learned about procrastination, the
planning fallacy, loss aversion, intertemporal discounting, and how
human beings respond to deadlines. Accordingly, it offers the best
hope of minimizing the risk of inadvertent forfeitures, increasing
the likelihood that plaintiffs with meritorious claims will file while
180. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
181. See generally John T. Harvey, Heuristic Judgment Theory, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 44, 47-
48 (1998) ("[E]xperimental psychology suggests that most important assumptions of rational
choice theory are violated with frequency in real life.").
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all or most of the value of their claims remain, and making possible
the fair and accurate adjudication of claims without imposing
excessive costs on defendants.
3. Treats Plaintiffs More Fairly
Although some have suggested that the limitation system is not
intended to punish dilatory plaintiffs,'82 that is wrong as a historical
matter. One of the two purposes Blackstone identified for having
statutes of limitation was "to punish [the plaintiffs] neglect."'83
Plaintiffs, however, should not be punished more severely than is
necessary to promote the goals of statutes of limitation. The
incremental approach is more fair to plaintiffs because the size of a
plaintiff's penalty depends on the degree of the plaintiffs fault. The
longer the plaintiff delays, excluding the grace period, which is not
fairly characterized as a period of "delay," the more deeply the value
of the plaintiffs claim is discounted. A plaintiff who misses one
deadline and loses all is treated very harshly,"M whereas a plaintiff
182. See, e.g., Ailes, supra note 5, at 483 ("[Ift has been argued, [that] prescription is
essentially a penalty inflicted upon the creditor because of his negligence .... Surely, it is a
most superficial and distorted analysis of a statute of limitations which finds its raison d'etre
in punishing negligence. The bar of the statute, while it may have the effect of causing
pecuniary loss to the creditor, was obviously not intended to punish his neglect. Far from
being a criminal, the long-suffering creditor usually merits all aid the law gives him; but for
practical reasons, the law is unable to aid him indefinitely.").
183. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *188. The other purpose identified by
Blackstone was that "it is presumed that the supposed wrongdoer has in such a length of time
procured a legal title, otherwise he would sooner have been sued." Id.; see also Wood v.
Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (explaining that statutes of limitation "punish
negligence').
184. As one commentator has observed:
My last category for unfair game design is the opportunity for total loss. And,
by this, I don't mean the option of getting wiped out of a game. That's perfectly
acceptable in many games, particularly if it's understood from the start.
However, what can feel more unfair is if the loss is an all or nothing sort of
thing. In a game I played a couple of weeks ago, which I didn't particularly like,
called Smugglers of the Galaxy, there's an entirely fair option for loss: you can
get attacked by other players, and every time they do, your ship loses a point of
hull. If that happens 5 times, your ship is destroyed and you start over. It's
entirely cruel, but it's gradual, and thus fair.
Conversely, a game which I adore, called Carcassonne has very unfair rules
for total loss of some elements of the game. There, you use your wooden figures
to control fields, cities, and roads; you can mark up many points, particularly in
fields which keep getting added to until the end of the game. But, if someone else
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who misses one deadline and loses only a percentage of the value of
her claim is treated relatively leniently. She may preserve most of
the value of her claim by meeting the next deadline. This is more
fair to plaintiffs because missing deadlines is common and difficult
for most people to avoid.185
4. Tracks More Closely the Harms Caused by Delay
Because it is gradual, the incremental penalty imposed on
plaintiffs under my proposal makes more sense than the present all-
or-nothing approach. The penalty suffered by the plaintiff for delay
more closely approximates the harms to the defendant and to
society as a whole resulting from the plaintiffs indiligence. For the
most part, those harms occur incrementally, not avulsively.
As an example, on average, evidence degrades gradually, rather
than all at once.l" The gradual degradation of evidence makes
outcomes more random and prone to error.187 It only makes sense to
reduce the stakes so that if the risk of error is higher, at least the
cost of any error that occurs will be less."s But there is no point in
overdoing it, which would simply cause an error in the opposite
direction. So the reduction in the stakes should roughly approxi-
mate the increased risk of error, rather than underestimate or
overestimate it. An incremental approach, even if imperfect, better
satisfies this objective than does an all-or-nothing approach.
5. Minimizes Pressure for Nullification
Ad hoc nullification of procedural rules to serve the perceived
needs of justice in a particular case is not uncommon.1 89 Because it
manages to sneak into your field before the game-end you can potentially lose
all of your points.
See Shannon Appelcline, Its Not Fair!, SKOTOS, June 24, 2004, www.skotos.netlarticles/
TTnTfTnT_149.phtml.
185. As Tyler Ochoa commented, "[i]t is better to walk down stairs than to fall off a cliff."
186. See Ochoa & Wistrich, Puzzling Purposes, supra note 15, at 474.
187. Epstein, supra note 4, at 1181.
188. See Posner, supra note 178, at 401.
189. See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of
Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PiTT. L. REV. 725, 755 (1989); Robert
S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for 'Process Values," 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39 (1974).
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is less harsh and more fair to plaintiffs, and because it parallels the
gradual accretion of the harms which the limitation system aims to
minimize, 9 ' the incremental approach is likely to reduce the
pressure courts presently feel to fudge the facts or distort limitation
of action rules in order to avoid time-barring claims.' For example,
a judge or a jury feeling psychological pressure to nullify the statute
of limitation for the benefit of a deserving plaintiff who was severely
injured by the defendant's misconduct is more likely to capitulate to
that pressure if the choice is between the plaintiff recovering 100
percent and the plaintiff recovering nothing, than it is if the choices
are between the plaintiff recovering 100 percent and the plaintiff
recovering 75 percent, or between the plaintiff recovering 75 percent
and the plaintiff recovering 50 percent. In the latter scenarios, the
plaintiff will at least receive something.'92 Therefore, the emotional
pressure factfinders will feel to bend the rules will be less.
6. More Consonant with the Fast Pace of Modern Life
The incremental approach is also more consistent with the pace
of modern life. Many have observed that the speed of events is
quickening.'93 Similarly, many of the obstacles to prompt filing
which existed during earlier eras, such as painfully slow travel and
communication, have been resolved. Viewed against this back-
ground, it seems only fitting that plaintiffs should be required to file
their lawsuits more promptly.' In addition, this would allow
190. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
192. On the other hand, losing 50 percent of the value of the claim may be like losing 100
percent of the value of the claim if the plaintiff will not be able to retain a lawyer or will lose
interest and simply not bother to pursue the claim.
193. See, e.g., JAMES GLEICK, FASTER: THE ACCELERATION OF JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING 9
(1999) ("We are in a rush. We are making haste. A compression of time characterizes the life
of the century now closing."); MARY SETTEGAST, MONA LISA'S MOUSTACHE: MAKING SENSE OF
A DISSOLVING WORLD 9 (2001) ("[O]ur everyday perception is that time itself has accelerated
while space has shrunk. The pace of life seems to be racing, and the entire geographical world
is suddenly 'here' as the barriers of conventional space are overcome by telecommunications
technology.").
194. Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property,
64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 682 (1986) ("[Ihe long limitation periods of ancient times appear to
be inappropriate today.").
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society to shift its attention from the past to the future, from which
new challenges are rapidly approaching.
7. More Consistent with Comparative Fault
Abandoning the all-or-nothing approach to statutes of limitation
is consistent with one of the fundamental themes of law, namely,
that when two principles are in tension, "the law's preferred course
is to seek an accommodating rule or result that is able to reduce, or
if possible to resolve, the original tension."'95 This underlying theme
animated the shift from contributory negligence to comparative
negligence, a change analogous to the one I am proposing here.
Until the 1970s, most jurisdictions followed a doctrine known as
contributory negligence in tort cases. 9 ' That doctrine provided that
if a plaintiff was injured due to a defendant's negligence, but the
plaintiff also was negligent, then the plaintiff would be disqualified
from receiving any remedy for the defendant's negligence.'97 This
doctrine persisted, even though it had long been regarded as unfair
to plaintiffs.' 9 During the last thirty years it has gradually been
replaced in nearly every state by some form of comparative fault,' 99
in which the plaintiffs negligence is not a complete defense to the
defendant's liability, but merely reduces it in proportion to the
195. Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE
L.J. 697, 725-26 (1978).
196. See id. at 697-98.
197. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1062 (8th ed. 2004).
198. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975) ("It is unnecessary for us to
catalogue the enormous amount of critical comment that has been directed over the years
against the 'all-or-nothing' approach of the doctrine of contributory negligence. The essence
of that criticism has been constant and clear: the doctrine is inequitable in its operation
because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault."); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833
S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. 1992) (describing contributory negligence as "outmoded and unjust");
John W. Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States and Its Present
Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REv. 299, 303 (1980) (observing that contributory negligence
was abandoned because "[there was no way to defend its obvious unfairness and the legal
profession knew it").
199. See McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 55-56 & nn.2-4; 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 801 & n.1
(2004); see also Tony Weir, All or Nothing, 78 TUL. L. REv. 511, 513 (2004) (arguing that "the
common law, as distinct from equity ... has traditionally preferred the 'all-or-nothing
approach"' but adding that "[t]his attitude has been changing for some time now, and the
change is very manifest").
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plaintiffs relative degree of fault or responsibility for the loss.2"0
Under a comparative fault regime, a plaintiff whose own negligence
caused 20 percent of his loss could still recover the remaining 80
percent of his loss from the negligent defendant.2'
Adopting an incremental approach to statutes of limitation is
akin to shifting from contributory negligence to comparative fault.
Rather than completely destroying the value of the plaintiffs claim
upon the expiration of the first deadline, it gives plaintiffs multiple
opportunities to file suit, albeit with the proviso that they suffer a
graduated penalty that increases as their delay in filing increases.
Thus, like comparative fault, the incremental approach penalizes
plaintiffs for engaging in conduct that is deleterious to themselves
and to society, but it does so in a more fair or humane manner that
maximizes both the chances that a plaintiff with a meritorious claim
will avoid an inadvertent forfeiture of the entirety of that claim and
the odds that he or she will file it sooner rather than later.
Comparative fault did not do away with any reduction of recovery
based upon the plaintiffs fault. It recognized that although "the
plaintiff is the biological victim of the accident," and thus "has a
strong 'first-party' incentive to prevent the accident without regard
to tort liability rules,"0 2 that is not necessarily a sufficient incentive
to induce socially optimal conduct. °s Similarly, in the context of
statutes of limitation, a plaintiff with a meritorious claim has an
incentive to file sooner rather than later, especially if prejudgment
interest is not available,0 4 because the plaintiffs delay in filing will
postpone the plaintiffs receipt of a remedy, thereby depriving her
of its productive use in the interim. Like comparative fault, my
proposal imposes an extra cost on the plaintiff who behaves in a
socially suboptimal way because in this context the naturally
occurring incentives are insufficient to achieve the desired results.
200. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1062 (8th ed. 2004).
201. Li, 532 P.2d at 1229.
202. Schwartz, supra note 195, at 710.
203. Id.
204. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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8. Summary
In sum, the incremental approach leaves everyone better off.
Plaintiffs are better off because if their claims are meritorious, they
receive their recoveries earlier, all other things being equal. °5 If
they do miss a deadline, their loss is partial rather than total. °6
Finally, plaintiffs are more likely to file their claims because the
initial deadline for doing so usually will be shorter than it presently
is.
Defendants also are better off. They will be notified of disputes
earlier and can attempt to resolve them informally through repairs,
settlements, or the like. Failing that, they can preserve the evidence
needed for their defense and be assured that their conduct will be
judged by the legal standards in place at the time they acted.
Nonparties also are better off. Those who deal with or depend on
plaintiffs or defendants can better plan for the future because
uncertainty regarding both the plaintiff's and the defendant's future
circumstances will be eliminated more quickly. In addition, because
prompt filing strengthens deterrence,' °7 fewer nonparties will be
harmed by misconduct in the future.
Courts also are better off. They can do a superior job of case
management because early filing gives them a broader range of
options in regulating the litigation process to ensure that adjudica-
tion occurs at the temporally optimal time.2" 8 In addition, because
deterioration of evidence will be minimized, their ability to decide
cases accurately and efficiently will be enhanced.
My proposal, of course, does not fix all of the problems that make
limitation of actions law so dysfunctional. Because it solves or
ameliorates several important ones, however, it would improve
statutes of limitation considerably.
205. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
206. See supra text accompanying note 164.
207. See supra text accompanying note 17 (noting that the passage of time reduces the
deterrent effect on defendants).
208. See infra text accompanying note 235.
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B. Potential Disadvantages
1. Handles Non-Monetary Remedies Inelegantly
One problem with the incremental approach is that it does not
map comfortably onto the full panoply of remedies available in civil
lawsuits. While this is a drawback, it will seldom be a serious one.
Damages are far and away the most important element of recovery
in civil actions. Damage awards, whether compensatory or punitive,
can easily be reduced by a percentage. In most cases, then, the most
common and most desired remedy will not pose a difficulty. The
same is true of other monetary elements of recovery, such as
prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, attorneys fees, costs
of suit, and restitution implemented by means of monetary pay-
ment.
Specific recovery of property or injunctions requiring conveyance
of property are a bit more problematic. Typically, however, the value
of real estate or unique pieces of personal property, such as a rare
painting, can be monetized by means of an appraisal.
Injunctions requiring, or more commonly, prohibiting, particular
future conduct, 9 pose more of a challenge. Often, however, con-
verting such relief into a numerical value will be possible. For
example, if a defendant is held to have infringed a patent with ten
years left to run and a plaintiff whose claim has been depreciated by
25 percent because of untimely filing seeks a permanent injunction,
the term of the injunction could be limited to seven and one half
years, rather than the full ten years' duration the plaintiff would
have obtained if he had sued more promptly. Alternatively, assume
that the defendant was selling 100,000 infringing copies of a
copyrighted work per year. A plaintiff who sued during year two,
that is, during months thirteen through twenty-four of a four-year
limitation period, would be limited to recovering 75 percent of its
monetary damages. Similarly, it could obtain injunctive relief
preventing the defendant from engaging in 75 percent of its
infringing sales. Thus, the defendant could continue to sell up to
25,000 infringing copies of the copyrighted work per year. This
209. See generally 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES §§ 2.9-11 (West 2d ed. 1993)
(discussing injunctions generally).
656 [Vol. 50:607
PROCRASTINATION
solution would provide an alternative to limiting the duration of the
injunction. Finally, if a defendant ordinarily would be enjoined from
engaging in specified conduct for the remainder of his lifetime, the
defendant's life expectancy could be determined from actuarial
tables, and then the duration of the permanent injunction could be
reduced from the remainder of the defendant's life expectancy to
just 75 percent of it.
Pure declaratory relief actions pose perhaps the greatest diffi-
culty, but these are quite rare.21 Typically, there is some sort of
monetary or behavioral consequence which flows from the declara-
tion. If so, it could be handled in one of the ways I have suggested
above.211 For example, if a declaratory judgment regarding the
interpretation of a contract term would have the consequence that
the defendant would receive $1000 less profit per year for the
remaining years of the contract, then a plaintiff who waited three
years to sue could only reduce the defendant's profit by $250 per
year, rather than by $1000 per year, which would have been
possible if he had sued promptly. Alternatively, if the contract had
four years remaining, then the plaintiff would only be able to reduce
the defendant's profits under the contract by $1000 during one of
the remaining four years, rather than during all four of them.
2. Treats Plaintiffs Less Favorably Than the Status Quo
A second problem with the incremental approach is that it seems
to treat plaintiffs more harshly than the status quo. Of course, this
is not a valid objection unless it is assumed that the status quo is
superior to my proposal. Nevertheless, it deserves analysis.
The incremental approach might be viewed as treating plaintiffs
more harshly in three different ways. To begin with, it shortens the
period between accrual of a claim and the first deadline on which
some sort of penalty is exacted for delay. Thus, in the example I
have been using, a plaintiff who presently would be able to delay
for nearly four years without suffering any penalty whatsoever
would now suffer a partial penalty after a delay of just one year.
210. Thurman W. Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REV. 913, 930
(1934) (noting that the use of declaratory judgments is "comparatively rare").
211. See supra Parts III.A-B. Where that is not present, then no statute of limitation may
be appropriate.
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This only treats plaintiffs more harshly, however, if it results in a
net reduction in the aggregate value of the plaintiffs' claims.
Although it might reduce the value of some plaintiffs' claims, on the
whole it should not. First, as the experiments described above show,
plaintiffs are more likely to file their claims when the deadline is
short than when the deadline is long.212 Therefore, some plaintiffs
who otherwise would not file their claims under the present scheme
will file them under my proposal. Two factors, however, may
undermine this effect. The first factor is that because filing a
lawsuit is more difficult and time-consuming than merely claiming
a rebate, the strength of this effect may drop below the level
suggested by the experiments when a more difficult task is involved.
Although this is plausible, there is some evidence to the contrary.
One study indicates that increasing the difficulty of the process for
claiming a rebate actually increased, rather than decreased, the
number of participants who claimed their rebate.213 The second
factor is that the bite of the periodic reductions is uncertain. On the
one hand, they should be strong enough to gain the attention of
plaintiffs who are informed about them. On the other hand, they
will impose a significant cost on plaintiffs. The initial penalty, which
would drop the value of a claim to 75 percent of its original worth,
probably would not have much impact on the rate of post-penalty
filing because much of the value of the claim would remain. The
second penalty, however, which would decrease the value of the
plaintiffs claim to just 50 percent of its original worth, might
significantly reduce the rate of post-penalty filing. At this level, it
could be difficult for plaintiffs to attract counsel, especially highly
accomplished counsel, to represent them on a contingency basis. In
addition, the incentive of a pro se litigant or a litigant retaining
counsel on an hourly fee basis to pursue his or her claim will be
substantially reduced. It may be expected that at the 25 percent
level, many plaintiffs may conclude that filing a claim is not
worthwhile, unless the value of a claim is very large or the plain-
tiffs emotional commitment to pursuing the claim is strong.
Therefore, the effective limitation period under my proposal may be
shorter than it seems.
212. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
213. See Silk, supra note 68, at 29-30.
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Second, research suggests that the incremental penalties exacted
for delay by my proposal will result in earlier filings than the
current single end-of-period deadline regime.214 Where there is no
prejudgment interest, or where the rate of prejudgment interest is
less than the market rate, plaintiffs will be better off if they file
earlier because they will receive their recovery earlier and be able
to invest it earlier. Only where the prejudgment interest rate
exceeds the market interest rate will plaintiffs be hurt by my
proposal. This, however, is an anomaly resulting from a poorly
designed prejudgment interest statute that plaintiffs have no
legitimate interest in perpetuating.
Third, some plaintiffs who cannot, or prefer not to, file right away
can file after two or three years of delay under the present scheme
without penalty, but under my proposal would suffer some penalty
for their delay.21 Here, a distinction must be drawn between plain-
tiffs who could not file earlier and those who simply chose not to file
earlier. The discovery rule of accrual, which now is applied to most
claims as to which event-based accrual and discovery-based accrual
are likely to diverge,"' accompanied by reasonable tolling of the
limitation period for disabilities or equitable considerations,217
adequately addresses the needs of the first group. A plaintiff who is
unaware that he has been defrauded, or is in a coma, or is physically
restrained from filing a lawsuit by the defendant, would not suffer
any penalty because he delayed in filing suit, at least so long as the
impediment existed. As for plaintiffs who simply have a taste for
deferring filing, this is an interest which, in light of its social costs
(i.e., defeating the purposes promoted by statutes of limitation),
society need not indulge.
The fact that limitation periods may effectively be somewhat
shorter than they presently are is not troubling in the abstract.
Shorter periods possess both costs and benefits for plaintiffs,
defendants, and society as a whole."' It is not at all clear that
longer periods are better when all costs and benefits are netted out.
214. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
215. See supra text accompanying note 164.
216. See O'Neal, supra note 24, at 115.
217. See Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 716,738-39 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
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In addition, existing limitation periods probably are too long. This
is not at all surprising because their duration is based in part upon
assumptions about how long it would take to file a lawsuit 400 years
ago, 2 19 a time when lawyers were scarce, courthouses were open only
sporadically, travel was by horseback, and computers were incon-
ceivable. Further, statutes of limitation have assumed an expressive
function divorced from their policy moorings. When conduct appalls
us, we first respond by increasing the sanction."' When that is not
feasible, we communicate our condemnation of the conduct by
lengthening the limitation period.22' While that may be emotionally
satisfying, it probably defeats rather than promotes limitation
policy.222 Finally, any reduction in the length of the limitation period
for some claims under my proposal would be partially compensated
for by an increase in the duration of the limitation period for other
claims. For example, if all claims were assigned a three- or four-year
limitation period, plaintiffs with breach of oral contract or automo-
bile accident negligence claims would have a shorter penalty-free
period but a longer overall period.223 Persons with employment
discrimination claims or claims against government entities might
have both longer penalty-free periods and longer overall periods.224
3. Equates the Plaintiffs Delay with the Defendant's Fault
Another possible concern is that the incremental approach
establishes a moral equivalence between a plaintiffs carelessness
in delaying the filing of a lawsuit and an intentional wrong commit-
ted by the defendant that inflicted a severe injury on the plaintiff.2 5
219. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Sanction of Imprisonment
for Serious Crime, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 36 (1976).
221. See Powell, supra note 30, at 134-39.
222. See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense
Cases, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1205, 1225-26 (2004); Listokin, supra note 19, at 113.
223. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1 (West 2008) (providing two years for injury or death
caused by wrongful or negligent act); id. § 339 (providing longer period for an oral contract).
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000) (stating that an individual wishing to file a federal
lawsuit alleging employment discrimination must first file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days after the allegedly unlawful
conduct occurred); see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2166-67,
2170 (2007).
225. A variation of this argument is that my proposal equates a severe injury suffered by
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This concern, however, is more apparent than real. To begin with,
the defendant's conduct will sometimes be merely negligent, or, like
a breach of contract, morally neutral (provided that the defendant
compensates the plaintiff). In that circumstance, equating the
plaintiffs delay with the defendant's misconduct is not incongruous.
Moreover, the plaintiff who files promptly-that is, within one
year-suffers no penalty at all, leaving the defendant's liability
undiminished. If the plaintiff delays beyond that point, however,
then the plaintiffs delay does reduce the defendant's liability. The
same, of course, could be said for comparative fault. Comparative
fault initially excluded reduction of the defendant's liability for
the plaintiffs fault if the defendant's misconduct was intentional
and the plaintiffs misconduct was merely negligent.226 This
prohibition, however, has been eroded.22 v The more modern view is
that "most types of intentional tort cases would be more fairly
decided if the courts could consider the fault of both parties. In such
cases comparative fault should be used . Further, at some
point, the plaintiff's delay in filing evinces at least negligence, if not
gross negligence or recklessness, with respect to the risk that
the plaintiff with an uncertain amount of harm suffered by the defendant from the delay in
filing. There are two responses to this variation. First, it is myopic, considering only the harm
to defendant and ignoring the harm to the societal interests promoted by statutes of
limitation. Second, as explained above, quantifying the harm to the defendant from
deterioration of evidence is impractical. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
Plainly, quantifying the harm to a much broader range of societal interests would be
impossible.
226. See Ellen M. Bublick, The End Game of Tort Reform: Comparative Apportionment and
Intentional Torts, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 355, 364 & n.27 (2003) ("The rule that intentional
and negligent fault are not explicitly compared has been firmly established in American
jurisprudence.").
227. See Jake Dear & Steven E. Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts:
Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 39 (1984) ("Courts
should openly recognize that the asserted 'different in kind' theory poses no theoretical
obstacle to comparison of intentional, reckless, and negligent conduct."); William J.
McNichols, Should Comparative Responsibility Ever Apply to Intentional Torts?, 37 OKLA. L.
REV. 641, 697 (1984) ("Apportionment principles do have a proper place when conduct that
intentionally invades plaintiffs legally protected interests is not significantly more culpable
than the plaintiffs own contributory fault.").
228. Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery
Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46
VAND. L. REv. 121, 174 (1993); cf. Andrew R. Klein, Comparative Fault and Fraud, 48 ARiz.
L. REV. 983, 985 (2006) (arguing that "comparative fault jurisdictions should not bar plaintiffs
from recovering in fraud when they fail to establish justifiable reliance on a misrep-
resentation").
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evidence will be lost. If that mental state is sufficient to subject a
party to severe sanctions for failing to preserve evidence in other
contexts,229 perhaps it should be enough in this context as well.
4. Fails To Distinguish Among Different Types of Claims
Another arguable problem with my proposal is that it is
transubstantive because it treats all claims as if they were the
same, taking a "one size fits all" approach. It is possible that some
distinctions among types of claims should be made. At present,
however, the classification of claims for statutes of limitation
purposes lacks any consistent rationale. 230 Thus, abandoning it
hardly seems like much of a loss. Moreover, there is a trade-off
between clarity and intuitiveness on the one hand, and maximizing
the ability to individualize the fit between a particular claim and
its corresponding limitation period, on the other hand. The law of
limitation of actions is so complicated and uncertain that it
necessitates legal advice, prolongs litigation, provokes inadvertent
forfeitures, and discourages settlement.231 The desire to individual-
ize the treatment of claims based on their nature is responsible for
much of the size and complexity of the law of limitation of actions.232
Because a limitation system can work only if litigants can compre-
hend its rules,233 I would opt for simplicity in almost every respect.
If every claim has the same limitation period and the same depreci-
ation schedule for late filing, there is a realistic possibility that
litigants will actually know when their claims must be filed.
Although having just one uniform limitation period and just one
uniform depreciation schedule are not essential features of my
proposal, I believe they would be beneficial.
229. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.
2002).
230. Richardson, supra note 22, at 1030-34.
231. See Albert Kocourek, A Comment on Moral Consideration and the Statute of
Limitations, 18 ILL. L. REv. 538, 549 (1924) ("The analomous and conflicting mass of rules
which has accumulated as a judicial gloss on the statutes of limitations stands in need of
legislative reformation.").
232. See Richardson, supra note 22, at 1044.
233. See supra note 20.
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5. Forces Plaintiffs To Defer Other Tasks
Another potential problem with my proposal is that it may force
plaintiffs to prioritize litigation more highly than they do under the
present regime. This might be perceived as unfair because it reduces
their autonomy, it may force them to choose between filing a lawsuit
and completing more urgent tasks, and it prevents them from
optimizing the timing of litigation from their point of view. Cer-
tainly, a limitation period that is too short may be unrealistic or
cause an ill-advised preoccupation with time.234 It is not clear,
however, that this presents much of a problem. For most people,
filing a lawsuit is something they will do only once or twice in a
lifetime. It is not too much to ask that they assign the task a high
priority in light of the substantial social costs caused by delay.
Repeat player plaintiffs pose even slighter concerns. Those who file
lawsuits frequently in the normal course of business can, and
ordinarily will, do so promptly. And if they do not without a good
excuse, they arguably deserve little sympathy.
6. Causes Premature Filings
Although a shorter statute of limitation may increase filings, or
stimulate earlier filing, those are not serious problems. If filings are
increasing because plaintiffs are better able to avoid inadvertent
forfeitures of their claims, that is a good thing, and the capacities of
courts should be expanded to satisfy the demand. On the other
hand, some cases that otherwise might have been resolved infor-
mally if the limitation period were longer may be filed unnecessar-
ily. This should not happen very often so long as a sufficient
penalty-free period, such as one year, is provided to allow informal
resolution to run its course in most cases. In addition, under my
proposal defendants will believe that plaintiffs will be motivated to
sue promptly. Therefore, defendants will be motivated to solve
problems more quickly before cases are filed. This means that
some plaintiffs will have their problems resolved earlier by repair,
234. Cartledge v. E. Jopling & Sons Ltd., [1962] 1 Q.B. 189, 195 (Sellers, L.J.) ("The courts
have discouraged delay in seeking redress and so has legislation, but on the other hand there
has been no encouragement given to precipitate litigation. It is undesirable for workmen to
be encouraged to keep their eyes on the courts.").
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pre-filing settlement, or the like. Accordingly, the shorter initial
deadline will have the effect of discouraging procrastination by
defendants in solving problems and resolving disputes. Finally,
wider use of tolling agreements could permit consensual extension
of the limitation period if both parties agree that allowing a longer
period for prefiling informal resolution would be productive. 35 Even
if the parties cannot agree to toll the limitation period, the plaintiff
can file the case and the court can stay it to ensure both that
attempts at informal resolution can run their course before the
parties incur unnecessary litigation-related expenses, and also that
adjudication occurs at the temporally optimal time.
V. OTHER POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
A. Criminal Prosecution
This Article focuses on statutes of limitation applicable to civil
lawsuits. Separate analysis of limitation of criminal prosecutions is
required because, as one scholar has acknowledged, "[t]he criminal
limitations statute is only partially similar in form and purpose to
its civil counterpart and is clearly different in its overall place and
function in the law." '236 Nevertheless, it appears that in at least some
respects the incremental approach I am suggesting for limiting civil
actions would apply equally well, if not even better, to the limitation
of criminal prosecutions.
For one thing, most criminal penalties-fines, years of incar-
ceration or on probation, etc.-are numerical in nature. Thus, the
obstacles encountered in adapting the incremental approach to non-
numerical remedies, such as injunctive or declaratory relief, would
seldom arise in the criminal context.237 Further, some of the policies
promoted by statutes of limitation loom even larger in the criminal
context than they do in the civil context. As an example, the interest
235. See, e.g., ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, CALIFORNIA AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES § 25.66 (West
2008).
236. Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses
at Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 259 (1995); see also 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW § 92 (15th ed. 1993) ("Although a statute of limitations in a civil case is merely
one of repose, a statute of limitations in a criminal case is jurisdictional in nature, creates a
bar to a criminal prosecution, and can be asserted at any time before or after judgment.").
237. The death penalty is one obvious exception.
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in repose... seems stronger in criminal cases than in civil cases, at
least for minor crimes.239 In addition, special efforts are made to
avoid mistakenly convicting the innocent in criminal cases.24 °
Accordingly, ensuring that evidence is fresh arguably is even more
important in criminal than in civil cases.
On the other hand, because criminal prosecutions typically
involve more serious and intentional wrongs-such as robberies,
rapes, and murders-than do civil cases, giving the defendant a
sentencing discount because of delay in commencing prosecution
suggests a moral equivalency between the crime and prosecutorial
delay that is more troubling than it would be in many civil cases.
B. Rights of Limited Duration
Although this Article concerns statutes of limitation, the incre-
mental approach to time limits also may be applied outside of that
narrow context. Freeing ourselves from the all-or-nothing approach
to time limits opens up many possibilities. For example, consider
rights of limited duration, such as copyrights. The current duration
of copyrights-the basic standard being life of the author plus
seventy years 241-strikes many as absurdly long.242 If they are right,
the most straightforward correction might be simply to reduce the
copyright term, such as by reverting to the basic standard of life of
the author plus fifty years that formerly was used.24 The incremen-
tal approach, however, suggests the possibility of another solution.
As an example, the copyright term could be changed to life of the
author plus twenty years with full protection, followed by a gradual
reduction in the value of the protection afforded over the remaining
238. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971) ("[C]riminal statutes of
limitation are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.").
239. Id.
240. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Wittman,
supra note 152, at 253.
241. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
242. See, e.g., Robert L. Bard & Lewis Kurlantzick, Copyright Duration at the Millennium,
47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 13, 61 (2000) ("What is striking about the arguments offered by
proponents of a lengthened copyright term is their lack of substance. Virtually none of the
reasons put forth for change have even a modicum of intellectual merit.").
243. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-96 (2003) (summarizing the history of
copyright term extension); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the
Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 19, 22-24 (2001).
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fifty years at the rate of 2 percent per year. Thus, although the term
of copyright protection would not be shortened, at some point
considerably short of the life of the author plus seventy years, the
benefit derived from enforcing the copyright would be no longer
worth the trouble for the vast majority of copyrighted works. This
would allow works of lesser value to be exploited relatively freely,
while copyright holders would still retain the ability to enforce,
albeit at a reduced level, their copyrights in more valuable works for
the full term.244
CONCLUSION
Time limits, including deadlines such as statutes of limitation,
play an important and necessary role in law, as they do in life.
Because of their significance, we should not simply assume that the
structure we have inherited from 1623, or even earlier, remains the
best we can do today. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once said, "It
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV.'' 246 Designing a more
effective structure for statutes of limitation requires us to do two
things. First, we must overcome the all-or-nothing bias246 so that we
can capitalize on the advantages offered by an incremental ap-
proach. Second, we need to take into account that recent empirical
studies reveal about how people actually behave. Only if we have
some understanding of procrastination, the planning fallacy, loss
aversion, intertemporal discounting, and the actual effects of
244. Two scholars have suggested something similar, namely, considering the time elapsed
since the creation of a work in determining the scope of the fair use defense to copyright
infringement. In their schemes, unauthorized uses of copyrighted works would be more likely
to be found to be fair uses late in the copyright term than early in the copyright term. See
Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REv. 775, 778 (2003); Joseph P. Liu,
Copyright and Time:A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409,410 (2002). Their proposals indirectly
support mine. They recognize that relevant changes occur throughout legal time periods, not
merely at the end of them. Both Hughes and Liu argue that law should take the gradual
nature of change over time into account in formulating legal rules. See Hughes, supra at 778;
Liu, supra at 411-12. That argument supports my proposal as well as their own.
245. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
246. John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and
Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 750, 791 (1964) (referring to the systematic preference for winner-
take-all outcomes as the "all-or-nothing bias").
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various types of deadlines on people's behavior can we craft a
limitation system that achieves its goals.
